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L JURIDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(j).
the Supreme Court had original jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j)
and transferred the matter to this Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-4.
II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES & STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issues presented for review in this case are:
A.

,

Whether the district court erred in holding that the Railroad Defendants had

no duty to upgrade the warning devices or take other measures to protect the public
commensurate with the risks at an ultra-hazardous crossing. (R. at 1270-75; 1278-80.)
Standard of Review: Correctness. Summary judgment is a question of law, and the
district court's resolution of the issue is afforded no deference. Tallman v. City of
Hurricanes. 985 P.2d 892. 893 (Utah 1999V Moreover, the issues of whether a defendant
owes a duty of care to a plaintiff is a question of law. Slisze v. Stanley-Bostitch. 979
P.2d 317. 320 (Utah 1999).
B.

Whether the district court erred in concluding that the Railroad Defendants

had no duty to reduce the train speed over an ultra-hazardous crossing. (R. at 1267-70.)
Standard of Review: Correctness. Summary judgment is a question of law,
and the district court's resolution of the issue is afforded no deference. Tallman. 985
P.2dat 893. Moreover, the issue of whether a defendant owes a duty of care to a
plaintiff is a question of law. Slisze. 979 P.2d at 320.
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C.

Whether the district court erred in holding that Amtrak did not have a duty

to apply its brakes before reaching an ultra-hazardous crossing, even when the train crew
knew that vehicles were crossing in front of the train. (R. at 1276-78.)
Standard of Review: Correctness. Summary judgment is a question of law,
and the district court's resolution of the issue is afforded no deference. Tallman. 985
P.2d at 893. Moreover, the issue of whether a defendant owes a duty of care to a
plaintiff is a question of law. Slisze. 979 P.2d 317. 320 (Utah 1999).
D.

Whether the district court erred in ruling that Amtrak had no duty to give

audible warning of the train's approach to an ultra-hazardous crossing, even when the
train crew knew that vehicles would likely cross in front of the train. (R. at 1275-76.)
Standard of Review: Correctness. Summary judgment is a question of law,
and the district court's resolution of the issue is afforded no deference. Tallman. 985
P.2d at 893. Moreover, the issue of whether a defendant owes a duty of care to a
plaintiff is a question of law. Slisze. 979 P.2d at 320.
E.

Whether the district court erred in ruling that the City of South Jordan had

no duty to upgrade the warning devices or provide additional protection at an ultrahazardous crossing, which UDOT had designated for upgrade, and whether the district
court erred in funding that City satisfied its duty of care.

(R. at 1280-83.)

Standard of Review: Correctness. Summary judgment is a question of law,
and the district court's resolution of the issue is afforded no deference. Tallman. 985
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P.2d at 893. Moreover, the issue of whether a defendant owes a duty of care to a
plaintiff is a question of law. Slisze. 979 P.2d at 320.
F.

Whether the district court erred in striking the affidavits of Archie

Burnham, Jr. P.E., Randy S. Hunter, Orlando Jerez, J. Clark Clenenden, and Paul F.
Byrnes. (R. at 1263-65.)
Standard of Review: Correctness. Whether the affidavits complied with the
requirement of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) is a question of law. GNS
Partnership v. Fullmer. 873 P.2d 1157. 1164 (Utah App. 1994); see Hall v. Fairmont
Homes. Inc.. 664 N.E.2d 546. 552 (Ohio App. 1995) f de novo" review).
Ill

CONSTITUTIONAL/STATUTORY PROVISIONS

This Court may be required to interpret the following statutory sections:
A.

Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-15.1. which provides: "The Department of

Transportation so as to promote the public safety shall as prescribed in the act provide
for the installing, maintaining, reconstructing, and improving of automatic and other
safety appliances, signals or devices at grade crossings on public highways or roads over
the tracks of any railroad or street railroad corporation in the state;"
B.

Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-15(2). which provides in part: "The department

shall have the power to determine and prescribe the manner... and the terms of
installation, operation, maintenance, use and protection of each crossing . . . of a public
road or highway by a railroad ...;" and
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C.

Utah Code Ann. § 56-1-11. which provides: "Every railroad company

shall be liable for damages caused by its neglect to make and maintain good and
sufficient crossings at points where any line of travel crosses its road."
IV.
A.

STATEMENT OF CASE

Nature of the Case

This wrongful death action arises from a collision between a high speed train and
a motor vehicle that occurred on the night of December 31,1995 at a railroad crossing
located at 102nd South in the City of South Jordan (the "Crossing"). The vehicle was
driven by Brent Larrabee, age 18 (the "Larrabee vehicle"). Brent had two passengers:
Jamie Swensen, age 19, and Aaron Price, age 18. Brent, Jamie and Aaron (sometimes
referred to as the "Decedents") were all killed in the collision. The Crossing was
equipped only with passive warning devices, the lowest level of crossing protection.
These devices consisted of old and faded pavement markings, a partially obscured
crossbuck sign, and a stop sign.
The Larrabee vehicle was the second in a group of three vehicles. The driver of
the first vehicle stopped at the stop sign at the Crossing, looked both ways, and
proceeded onto the Crossing. The driver did not become aware that a train was
approaching until she was on the Crossing directly infrontof it. Brent Larrabee then
came to the stop sign and brought his vehicle to a full stop. He was unaware of the
approaching train, and proceeded over the crossing. When his vehicle was in the middle
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of the Crossing, a northbound Amtrak train traveling at approximately 70 mph struck the
vehicle, propelling it several hundred feet into a utility pole. Brent, Jamie, and Aaron
were all fatally injured and died at the scene.
The train crew saw the three vehicles approaching the Crossing. The crew
testified that they were afraid the vehicles would not stop at the Crossing and were aware
that the vehicles might be hit. Nevertheless, the locomotive engineer did not sound the
emergency whistle signal nor did he slow or brake the train until the point of collision.
The parents of Brent, Jamie, and Aaron (the "Parents") brought this wrongful
death action against the City of South Jordan ("the City"), which is the roadway
authority, Southern Pacific Transportation Co. ("Southern Pacific"), which is the owner
and operator of the line, and the National Railroad Passenger Corporation ("Amtrak"),
which is the owner and operator of the train (together the "Defendants"). (R. at 1-10.)
(Southern Pacific and Amtrak are collectively referred to as the "Railroad Defendants.")
The Parents alleged that the existing warning devices were inadequate and that the
Crossing was ultra-hazardous and, as such, required additional protection that
Defendants failed to provide. The Parents also claimed that the crew was negligent in
their operation of the train and failed to give adequate warning of the train's approach.
B.

Course of Proceedings Below,

On May 15, 1997, the Parents commenced this action in the Third Judicial District
Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah against Defendants for their negligent acts and
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omissions leading to the wrongful death of their children. (R. at 1-10.) On November
16,1998, the City moved for summary judgment (R. at 151-87) and on November 17,
1998, the Railroad Defendants jointly moved for summary judgement. (R. at 214-541.)
All of the Defendants also moved to strike portions of the Parents' affidavits. (R. 110318 & 1161-98.) The district court, judge Anne M. Stirba presiding, heard oral arguments
on the motions on February 25, 1999. (R. at 1368-411). The district court re-opened the
record to consider Plaintiffs Supplement to Oral Argument in Opposition the City's
motion for summary judgment and the response thereto. (R. at 1234-37 & 1241-46.)
C.

Disposition in the District Court,

On May 4, 1999, the district court entered its Memorandum Decision granting
Defendants' motions for summary judgment and striking affidavits ("the Order"). (R. at
1258-85.) The district court entered a judgment of dismissal of the City on June 2, 1999
(R. at 1310-15) and a judgment of dismissal of the Railroad Defendants on June 4, 1999
(R. at 1323-25). The Parents timely filed their Notice of Appeal on June 15, 1999.
V,
A,

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The Collision,
1.

On the night of December 31,1995, Brent Larrabee, Jamie

Swensen, and Aaron Price met with some of their friends for the new year's holiday.
The three friends were driving in a group of three vehicles. Brent Larrabee was driving
the middle car of the group of three. (R. at 1261.)
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2.

Brent Larrabee drove west on 106th South, crossing the railroad

tracks at that location. The railroad grade crossing at 106th South is protected with
flashing lights and gates. (A diagram of the Crossing is located at R. 887.)
3.

These gates and lights were not activated when the Larrabee vehicle

crossed over the 106th South crossing. In fact, these devices did not activate until after
the third vehicle, which lagged behind the other two, had crossed the 106th South
crossing. (R. at 928, Knapp Depo., at pp. 19-20.)
4.

The three vehicles drove north on 3rd West to the Crossing at 102nd

South where the roadway jogs to the east to the Crossing. (R. 887.)
5.

Jacque Zimmerman, the driver of the first vehicle, stopped at the

stop sign at the Crossing and looked both ways. Not seeing a train, she proceeded across
the Crossing. (R. at 933, Zimmerman Depo., at pp. 37-38.) Jacob Wattleworth, a
passenger in Jacque's car, looked both ways when Jacque stopped at the stop sign and
also did not see the train. (R. at 916, Wattleworth Depo., at pp. 18, 20-24.) It was not
until Jacque had driven onto the tracks that she and her passengers first saw the train.
(Id.; R. at 933, Zimmerman Depo., at 37-38.)
6.

Brent Larrabee, the driver of the second vehicle, then came up to the

stop sign at the Crossing and stopped. (R. at 925, Thornley Dep. at p. 61.) Brent
remained stopped for approximately three seconds-sufficient time to look and see any
noticeable train. (Id.) Apparently not seeing the approaching train, he began across the
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tracks. (Id.) Whenhis vehicle reached the middle of the Crossing, a northbound Amtrak
train traveling at approximately 70 mph struck the Larrabee vehicle propelling it several
hundred feet into a utility pole. Brent, Jamie, and Aaron were fatally injured and died at
the scene. (R. at 1260.)
B.

The Train Crew's Actions,
7.

The train crew operated the train at approximately 70 miles per

hour. (R. at 1269.)
8.

The train crew saw the three vehicles approaching well in advance

of the Crossing and knew they might not be aware of the approaching train and might
cross in front of it. (R. at 1006, Thornley Dep. at pp. 53, 56.) David Maxfield, one of
the train crew, testified that at least 1500 feet before the train reached the Crossing he
became concerned that the cars might cross in front of the train and be hit. (R. at 1012,
Maxfield Depo., at pp. 61-62.)
9.

Despite this concern, the train crew did not slow or brake the train

until impact. (R. at 1016, Thornley Depo. at p. 67.)
10.

Also despite this concern, the train crew did not sound the

emergency whistle signal before reaching the Crossing. (Id. at p. 68.)
C.

The Ultra-Hazardous Condition at the Crossing,
11.

The district court assumed in its Order that the Crossing was

ultra-hazardous and needed additional warning devices. (R. at 1267, 1274.)
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12.

There is ample evidence that the Crossing is in fact ultra-hazardous:
a.

The Crossing is used by a high volume of high-speed trains.

b.

The configuration of the crossing is such that a driver's

(R. at 912, 913.)

visibility of northbound trains is highly restricted. (R. at 887.) At the Crossing, the
railroad track is begins to curve westerly and the roadway intersects the track in the
middle ofan"S" turn. (Id.) Accordingly, northbound trains overtake northbound
vehicles from behind and at an awkward angle. (Id.) Because of this configuration, a
driver's visibility of an oncoming train becomes "deceptive and difficult," making the
Crossing "excessively] hazardous]." (R. at 889-92, Burnham Aff.) In fact, both the
Utah Department of Transportation ("UDOT") and the City have recognized that the
crossing has "a very bad crossing angle and poor sight distances." (R. at 896.) The
visibility problems are compounded because the track is elevated.
€•

The stop sign and crossbuck were not fully visible until a

vehicle was at the intersection, the advance warning sign was not properly reflectorized,
and the stop ahead sign was improperly located and inadequately reflectorized. (R. at
891, Burnham Aff)
13.

The Crossing's ultra-hazardous nature is demonstrated by the

accident history at the site. In 1938, a train collided with a school bus at the Crossing,
killing 20 children and the school bus driver. From 1980 through 1995, there were seven
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separate incidents in which trains hit cars. (R. at 889-92, Burnham AfF. ^ 13.) In fact,
UDOT had predicted a "high . . . accident rate" at the Crossing in the future. (R. at 913.)
D.

The Defendants9 Failure to Upgrade the Crossing's Warning Devices.
14.

Despite the ultra-hazardous nature of the Crossing, the public is

protected only by "passive" warning devices, consisting of an advance warning sign,
pavement markings, crossbuck signs, and a stopsign. (R. at 1261.) Passive warning is
the lowest of form of warning, which can be upgraded to "active "warning devices (such
as lights and gates) or grade separation (such as an overpass or underpass.) (Id.)
15.

The passive warning devices in place were worn, not legible, not

fully reflectorized, and improperly positioned so as to be obscured until a vehicle is at the
intersection. (R. at 889, 891, Burnham Aff)
16.

UDOT, the City and the Railroad Defendants have all recognized

since at least 1979 that the passive protection at the Crossing is inadequate. However,
Defendants have failed to upgrade the protection, including failing to install gates and
lights, failure to impose a slow order on trains, failure to close the Crossing, failure to
alter the design of the Crossing, and failure to take other similar protective measures.
17.

The following is the chronology of events leading to the collision:
a.

July 1979 - UDOT recommends to the City that automatic

flashing lights and gates be installed at the Crossing, indicating that such improvements
would be "safer by far" than the passive warning devices. (R. at 949-51.)
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b.

August 1979 - The City agrees to UDOT's recommendation.

c.

May 1984 - The City fails to install additional warning

(R. at 953, 955.)

devices and UDOT reiterates to the City the need for lights and gates. (R. at 957.)
d.

June 1984. UDOT completes a Design Study Report (the

"1984 Report") stating that the existing stop signs, crossbucks, and advance warning
signs were "inadequate." (R. at 912-13.) The 1984 Report also predicts a "high . . .
accident rate" and notes the high volume of high-speed trains that use the Crossing. (Id)
e.

August 1984 - UDOT again notifies the City that automatic

lights and gates are needed at the Crossing and attaches the 1984 Report. (R. at 959-62.)
f.

March 1985 - UDOT asks the City to enter into a cooperative

agreement for construction of the safety improvements at the Crossing. (R. at 964-76.)
g.

December 1985 - UDOT again notifies the City that flashing

lights and gates have been approved for the Crossing. It also states that closure of the
Crossing is another alternative. (R. at 978-79.)
hv

July 1987 - UDOT asks the City to move forward with safety

improvements at the Crossing. (R. at 981.)
i.

September 1989 - UDOT completes an Environmental Study

for upgrading the Crossing (the "1989 Study"). (R. at 908-10). The 1989 Study
recognizes that the Crossing is "substandard" and proposes the installation of flashing
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light signals and gates. (Id. at 909.) The 1989 Study concludes: "There are only two
alternatives. Do the rehabilitation or do nothing. The do nothing alternative is
unacceptable because existing protection is inadequate." (IdL)
j.

May 1990- UDOT notifies the City that if the Crossing

remains open it must haveflashinglights and gates installed. (R. at 983-85.)
k.

June 1992 - The City agrees to place additional passive

warning devices at the Crossing. (R. at 896-98, Surveillance Review.)
1.

July 1992 - The City acknowledges the Crossing is

"dangerous" and expresses its desire to close the Crossing. The City admits that the
closure of the Crossing may take up to five years. The City again acknowledges the need
at least for additional warning signs to temporarily help the situation. (R. at 987-88.)
m.

October 1992 - UDOT notifies the City that the additional

warning signs have not been installed and pleads with the City to do so. (R. at 990.)
n.

July 1979-December 1995 - Despite the City acknowledging

that the Crossing is dangerous and agreeing to install lights and gates, and despite
UDOT's efforts to persuade the City to do so, no improvements to the passive devices
were ever made and no lights or gates were installed.
o.

December 1995 - Jamie Swensen, Aaron Price and Brent

Larrabee are killed at the Crossing. (R. at 1260.)
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18.

The City knew that federal funds were available for 90% of the cost

of upgrading the Crossing and that it only had to pay 10%. In 1979 the cost to the City
would have been only $6,000 to $7,200. (R. at 949-51, 953, 955.) In 1984 it would
have been only $9,000. (R. at 964-76.) And, in 1990 it would have been only $13,000.
(R. at 983-85.) In 1996, only weeks after the tragic collision, the City paid
approximately $25,000 to improve the passive warning devices at the Crossing. (R. at
992-96; Milheim Dep. at pp. 31-34.) Automatic warning devices, flashing lights, and
gates have still not been installed at the Crossing.
19.

The Railroad Defendants could have upgraded the Crossing with

flashing lights and gates at any time before the Collision at their own volition. (R. at
998, 999, Hunter Aff.; R. at 1002, 1004, Jerez Aff.)
E.

Disputed Material Facts,

The Court granted summary judgment for Defendants even though there are many
issues of material fact that are disputed:
20.

. •.

•,

?

u;

The district court found that at the time of the Collision a stop sign,

crossbuck sign, and an advance warning sign were in place. (R. at 1260.) This fact is not
disputed. However, the district court's finding that these devices were "visible the night
of the Collision" is disputed. (R. at 1277.) The pavement markings were old, worn and
faded at the time of the collision and were difficult to see. The advance warning sign
was not fully reflectorized. The stop sign was confusing to approaching motorists.
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Moreover, the stop sign was placed infrontof the crossbuck signs partially obscuring the
driver's view of the railroad crossbuck. The crossing warning signs also were not
appropriate to warn traffic approaching this railroad crossing and did not meet the
standards of the Manual of Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD). (R. at 889-92.
Burnham Aff.; R. at 894, photograph of roadway.)
21.

h-

Whether the passive warning devices at the Crossing were adequate

and effective is also disputed:
a.

>

The warning signs were not adequately visible. (R. at 889-

92. Burnham Aff.) UDOT recognized the inadequacy of the passive warning signs
throughout its correspondence with the City, in the 1984 Report ("existing protection [is]
inadequate"), and in the 1989 Study (installing lights and gates necessary because
"existing protection is inadequate"). (See ^f 17.a-.m above.)
b.

The City recognized the inadequacy of the passive warning

signs by acknowledging that the crossing was dangerous and by pledging to place
additional passive devices until the Crossing was closed. (R. at 987-88; R. at 896-98.)
c.

The passive warnings were inadequate because the Crossing

is ultra-hazardous. The Crossing's configuration has a "very bad crossing angle." (R. at
896.) This configuration provided "poor sight distances" (id.) and made a driver's
visibility of an oncoming train "deceptive and difficult." (R. at 889-92, Burnham Aff.)
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d.

The inadequacy and ineffectiveness of the existing warning

devices is evidenced by the witnesses. Despite having stopped and looked, the first
vehicle's occupants were unaware of the train until they had pulled onto the Crossing.
(R. at 933, Zimmerman Depo., at pp. 37-38; R. at 916, Wattleworth Dep. at pp. 18-24.)
e.

Brent Larrabee's actions also evidence the ineffectiveness of

the passive warning devices. Brent stopped at the Crossing for approximately three
seconds, long enough to look both ways, before proceeding across the tracks. (R. at 92526; Thornley Depo. at p. 61.) When Brent pulled forward, the train was only moments
from the Crossing. (Id) The only reasonable inference from Brent's actions is that he
could not see the train.
22.

The district court's finding that the Train was capable of being seen,

and its corollary finding that the raised track increased the train's visibility, are disputed.
(R. at 1275; 1282; 262, 1277.) Contrary to the district court's findings, the Crossing's
configuration has a "very bad crossing angle." (R. at 896.) This configuration provided
"poor sight distances" (id) and made a driver's visibility of oncoming trains "deceptive
and difficult." (R. at 889-92, Burnham Aff.) Moreover, the occupants of the first car
testified that they could not see the train until they were on the track. (See ^ 5 above.)
Brent Larrabee's own actions (i.e., pulling onto the track directly infrontof the train)
also evidence that the train was not reasonably capable of being seen. (See^j 6 above.)
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23.

The Court's finding that the first car came to a "rolling stop" is

disputed. (R. at 1262.) In fact, it is undisputed that the driver of the first car came to a
complete stop. (See If 5 above; R. at 787, Hackett Depo., at p. 22, 24.)
24.

Whether the train crew gave an audible warning between 106th

South crossing and the subject Crossing is disputed. (See R. at 1262, R. at 1277.) The
occupants of the vehicles did not hear the train horn until the instant before the collision.
(R. at 937, Wattleworth Depo. at p. 36; R. at 940, Sant Depo. at pp. 59-62.)
25.

The district court's finding that the engineer knew of should have

know that Brent Larrabee might cross in front of the train "only when [he] started across
the track" is disputed. In fact, it is undisputed that the train crew saw the three vehicles
approaching in a caravan well in advance of the Crossing and knew they might not be
aware of the approaching train or might try to beat the train across the Crossing. (R. at
1006, Thornley Dep. at p. 53, 56.) David Maxfield, one of the crew, testified that at least
1500 feet before the train reached the Crossing he became concerned that the cars were
going to pull infrontof the train and be hit. (R. at 1012, Maxfield Dep., at p. 61-62.)
26.

The district court'sfindingthat the Defendant Railroads did not

allow a dangerous condition on the track is disputed. (R. at 1274-75; 1279.) The
dangerous Crossing configuration accompanied by inadequate warning devices are the
dangerous condition. (See.fflf 11-17 above.)
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VI.
1,

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

The district court erred in holding that the Railroad Defendants did not

have a duty to upgrade the warning devices or take other measures to protect the public
commensurate with the risks posed at the Crossing. The Court correctly assumed, and
there is ample evidence to show, that the Crossing was "more than ordinarily hazardous."
At ultra-hazardous crossings, Utah law imposes upon railroads a duty to take measures to
reduce the risks at the crossing commensurate with the danger posed to the public.
Walker v. Union Pacific R. Co.. 844 P.2d 335, 340-42 (Utah App. 1993). Because the
district court erred in finding that Amtrak owed no such duty, this Court should reverse
the order granting summary judgement. The issue of whether the Railroad Defendants
breached this duty by failing to take "commensurate measures" to reduce the risks posed
by the Crossing is a question of fact for a jury.
2.

The district court erred in holding that the Railroad Defendants did not

have a duty to reduce the train speed over the Crossing. At ultra-hazardous crossings,
Utah law imposes upon railroads a duty to take measures to reduce the risks at the
crossing commensurate with the danger posed to the public. Walker. 844 P.2d at 340-42.
One of the possible measures a railroad may take to satisfy this duty is to reduce its train
speed through a "slow order." Because the district court erred in finding that Amtrak
owed no such duty, this Court should reverse the order granting summary judgement.
Whether the Railroad Defendants breached this duty by failing to issue a "slow order" is
a question of fact for the jury.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

SaltLake-l 14345.1 0027625-00001

17

The Parents' claim that the Railroad Defendants negligently failed to lower the
train speed over the Crossing is not preempted by federal law. 49U.S.C. § 20106
provides that a state law regarding train safety is not preempted if it is necessary to
eliminate or reduce an "essentially local safety hazard." The ultra-hazardous conditions
at the Crossing and the inadequate protection from those conditions render the Crossing a
"local safety hazard."
3.

The district court erred in holding that Amtrak crew did not have a duty to

apply the train's brakes before reaching the Crossing. Under Utah law, the train crew
had the duty to apply the train's brakes when it knew or should have know that the
Larrabee vehicle might cross infrontof it. Lawrence v. Bamberger R.R., 282 P.2d 335.
338 (Utah 1955.) Moreover, because the Crossing was ultra-hazardous, the train crew
could not assume that Brent Larrabee would be able to take reasonable precautions to
avoid a collision. There is a disputed issue of material fact as to when the train crew
knew or should have known that Brent Larrabee would cross in front of the train.
Because the district court erred in finding that Amtrak owed no duty to brake and
ignored the disputed issues of material fact, this Court should reverse the order granting
summary judgement.
4.

,

The district court erred in holding that Amtrak did not have a duty to

provide adequate audible warning of the train's approach. Utah law provides that a train
crew has a duty to use all reasonable efforts to warn someone that it knew or should have
know was in danger. Lawrence. 282 P.2d at 338. Utah law also imposes a duty upon
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railroads to take measures to reduce the risks at an ultra-hazardous crossing
commensurate with those risks. Walker, 844 P.2d at 340-42. Whether Amtrak breached
these duties by failing to give adequate audible warning is a question of fact. Because
the district court erred in finding that Amtrak owed no duty and ignored the disputed
issues of material fact, this Court should reverse the order granting summary judgement.
The Parents' claim that Amtrak breached its duty of care by failing to give
adequate audible warning is not preempted by federal law. 49U.S.C. $ 20106 provides
that a state law regarding train safety is not preempted if it is necessary to eliminate or
reduce an "essentially local safety hazard." The ultra-hazardous conditions at the
Crossing and the inadequate protection from those conditions render the Crossing a
"local safety hazard."
5.

The district court erred in holding that the City of South Jordan had no

duty to upgrade the warning devices or provide additional protection at the Crossing.
Under Utah law, municipalities have a duty to maintain streets reasonably safe for travel,
including the duty to provide "reasonably sufficient" warnings to warn the public of
dangerous conditions on the street. Fishbaugh v. Utah Power & Light 969 P.2d 403,
406 (Utah 1998). Whether the City breached this duty by failing to provide "reasonably
sufficient" warning is a question of fact. The district court also erred by ignoring ample
evidence that the devices at the Crossing were not "reasonably sufficient." Because the
district court misapplied the City's duty and because there are disputed issues of material
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fact as to whether the City breached this duty, this Court should reverse the order
granting summary judgement.
6.

The district court erred in striking the affidavits of Archie Burnham, Jr.,

Randy S. Hunter, Orlando Jerez, J. Clark Clenenden, and Paul F. Byrnes from its
consideration of the motions for summary judgment. The expert affidavits submitted in
opposition to the motions for summary judgment complied with both Rule 56(e) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the Utah Rules of Evidence.
Vn.

ARGUMENT

The district court's order granting Defendants' motions for summary judgment
should be reversed for erroneously defining the duties of care owed by Defendants to the
Decedents and ignoring evidence creating disputed issues of material fact. The Court
began its analysis properly by assuming that the Crossing was "more than ordinarily
hazardous" (or in other words, "ultra-hazardous"). Despite this assumption, however,
the district court held that Defendants had no duty to make this ultra-hazardous Crossing
safe for the public. According to the district court, Defendants had no duty to provide
effective warning devices or take other protective measures, no duty to run the train at a
slower speed, no duty to sound the horn, and no duty to break. Essentially, the district
court's decision immunizes railroads and municipalities from exercising any level of care
at railroad crossings. In doing so, however, the district court ignored well-established
Utah case law setting forth the duty of railroads to warn and protect the public at ultrahazardous crossing and the duty of municipalities to provide reasonably sufficient
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warning of dangerous conditions on public streets. The district court's order also ignores
good public policy. If allowed to stand, railroads will be permitted to run trains at high
speeds over ultra-hazardous crossings without the railroads or the municipalities-those in
the best position to evaluate and mitigate hazards-having any responsibility to protect or
warn would-be travelers. Similarly, municipalities will be permitted to ignore the
directives of UDOT and renege on commitments to upgrade crossing protection.
Accordingly, this Court should reverse the district court's order granting defendants
summary judgment.
A.

The District Court Erred in Holding that the Railroad Defendants Had
No Duty To Provide Adequate Warning Devices or Take Other
"Commensurate Measures" to Protect the Public at the Crossing.

The Parents have alleged that the Crossing is ultra-hazardous and, as such, the
Railroad Defendants should have taken measures to protect the public commensurate
with the dangers at the Crossing. (R. at 4, 5.) The district court, however, held as a
matter of law that under Utah Code Ann. $ 54-4-15.1 the Railroad Defendants had no
duty to upgrade the warning devices or take other measures despite the ultra-hazardous
nature of the Crossing. (R. at 1270-75.)
The district court erred. Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-15.1 provides: "The Department
of Transportation so as to promote the public safety shall as prescribed in the act provide
for the installing, maintaining, reconstructing, and improving of automatic and other
safety appliances, signals or devices at grade crossings on public highways or roads over
the tracks of any railroad or street railroad corporation in the state." Although this statute
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may vest UDOT with the authority for governing the installation of automatic warning
devices at railroad grade crossings, it does not abrogate a railroad's duty of care to the
public when a crossing is "more than ordinarily hazardous." Walker v. Union Pacific R.
Co.. 844 P.2d 335, 340-42 (Utah App. 1993); Wilde v. Denver & Rio Grande Western
R.R. Co.. No. C-83-149J. 1985 WL 17370 (D. Utah. Apr. 3. 1985V see also Duncan v.
Union Pac. R.R. Co., 842 P.2d 832. 833 (Utah 1992V Gleave v. Denver & Rio Grande
Western R.R.. 749 P.2d 660. 662-63 (Utah App. 1988): English v. Southern Pacific Co..
45 P. 47 (1896V1 Instead, Utah law recognizes that when a crossing is ultra-hazardous a
railroad has a duty to adequately warn motorists of the existence of railroad crossings
and of the approach of trains: "Tf a crossing is more than ordinarily hazardous, the
railroad cannot simply ignore the fact and put the public in peril until the Department of
Transportation acts. Until the department acts, the reasonable care standard requires the
railroad to take other measures to reduce the risks of a crossing commensurate with the
risks it imposes upon the public.9" Walker. 844 P.2d at 341 n. 6 (quoting Wilde, No.
C-83-149J, slipop. at3).
A crossing is deemed ultra-hazardous "if, for any reason, devices employed at the
Crossing [are] rendered inadequate to warn the public of the danger." Duncan. 842 P.2d

1

The Railroad Defendants duty to provide adequate warning also arises under
Utah Code Ann. § 56-1-11. This statute provides: "Every railroad company shall be
liable for damages caused by its neglect to make and maintain good and sufficient
crossings at points where any line of travel crosses its road." Making and maintaining
"good and sufficient" crossings would necessarily include providing an appropriate level
of protection at ultra-hazardous crossings.
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at 834; see also Walker. 844 P.2d at 342. In this case, the district court properly assumed
for purposes of deciding Defendants' motions for summary judgment that the Crossing
was ultra-hazardous and needed additional crossing protection. (R. at 1267; 1274.) In
fact, there is ample evidence that the Crossing is more than ordinarily hazardous: the
configuration of the track provides poor visibility of oncoming trains, the Crossing is
used by a high volume of high-speed trains, and the then-existent warning signs were
faded and improperly positioned. (See. Section V, <H 11 -13.)
Thus, assuming that the Crossing is ultra-hazardous (see. Schnuphase v.
Storehouse Markets, 918 P.2d 476. 477 (Utah 1996) (assuming all facts and inferences in
light most favorable to nonmoving party)), the Railroad Defendants had the duty to take
measures to reduce the risk of the Crossing "commensurate with the risks" the Crossing
imposes upon the public. Walker. 844 P.2d at 341 n. 6. These "commensurate
measures" include a number of different options. Among these options, the Railroad
Defendants could have ordered train crews to use extra caution on approach to the
Crossing or they could have issued a slow order to train crews requiring them to slow
down at the Crossing until adequate warning devices were installed.2 See Wilde.
C-83-149J. 1985 WL 17370 * 3; see also R. at 1032-33, Clendenen Aff. Because the
district court did not impose upon the Railroad Defendants a duty to take measures to

2

Other "commensurate measure" might include providing a flagman at the
Crossing or ceasing operations over the Crossing until adequate crossing warning
devices were installed. Also, Southern Pacific could have altered the design of the
Crossing.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR,
23 may contain errors.

SaltLakc-l 14345.1 0027625-00001

warn or protect the public commensurate with the risks posed at the Crossing, this Court
should reverse the district court's order. Whether the Railroad Defendants breached this
duty by not taking "commensurate measures" is a question of fact for the jury to decide.
Kitchen v. Cal Gas Co.. 821 P.2d 458. 461 (Utah App. 1991) ("[t]he issue of... [a]
breach of a legal duty is normally a question of fact for the jury. Accordingly, summary
judgment is generally improper on the issue of negligence and only in clean-cut cases,
with the exercise of great caution should a court take the issue of negligencefromthe
province of the jury.99).

r

In addition to slow orders, special crew warnings, and other alternatives, the
possible "commensurate measures99 could also include installing automatic lights and
gates. Under Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-15.1. UDOT is vested with the authority to govern
the installation of automatic warning devices at railroad crossings. However, this statute
does not preclude railroads from installing these devices at their own volition. While
railroads may be required under this statute to obtain UDOT's permission to install
automatic warning devices, once obtained, the railroads may install these warning
devices at their own expense. (R. 998-1000, Hunter Aff.; and R. at 1002-04, Jerez Aff.)
The fact that UDOT governs the installation of automatic warning systems does not
permit railroads to sit on their hands and wait for UDOT to issue a direct order before
seeking to install automatic devices: they arefreeto seek permission at any time.3
3

This duty is different than that discussed in Duncan. 842 P.2d at 834. In
Duncan, the petitioners argued, unsuccessfully, that the railroad had a duty to petition
UDOT to improve warnings at a crossing (which was not ultra-hazardous) and to change
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Moreover, it would simply be inconsistent to impose upon railroads a duty to take
measures commensurate with the risk at ultra-hazardous crossings and then preclude
them from choosing to meet that obligation by installing lights and gates. Here,
installing automatic warning devices at the Crossing is exactly what UDOT envisioned
and approved: as early as 1979 UDOT determined that the Crossing required automatic
protection. (R. at 949-51.)
The U.S. Supreme Court agrees that railroads retain joint responsibility for the
installation of adequate warning devices. CSX Transportation. Inc. v. Easterwood, 507
U.S. 658 0993). In Easterwood, the Supreme Court held that railroads are not relieved
of their common law duty to maintain the safety of grade crossings simply because final
authority over the actual installation of safety devices rests with state and local
governments. Id. at 664 n. 5 & 666-67. The Court stated that: "While final authority for
the installation of particular safety devices at grade crossings has long rested with state
and local governments . . . this allocation of authority . . . does not relieve the railroads of
their duty to take all reasonable precautions to maintain grade crossing safety . . .
including, for example, identifying and bringing to the attention of the relevant
authorities dangers posed by particular crossings." Id
In this case, the district court attempted to distinguish the Supreme Court's ruling
by concluding that the issue in Easterwood was federal preemption of a common law
the "priority index" for crossing improvements. IJL The duty here, however, is not to
urge UDOT to improve the warnings or change priorities. Instead, the duty is to seek
permission from UDOT for the railroad itself to install the automatic gates and lights.
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duty and not "whether, in the context of a state statutory scheme which vests exclusive
responsibility for crossing design with state government, a railroad nevertheless
r

continues to have a historical common law shared duty." (R. at 1273.) However, the
district court has confused the statutory scheme with the common law duty. In Utah, the
statutory scheme directs that UDOT is the governing authority for determining the need
for and type of improvements to automatic warning devices. In Easterwood, the
Supreme Court interpreted a Georgia statute, which also directed that no person shall
place or maintain railroad warning signs on public highways. Easterwood 507 U.S. at
664 n. 5 (referring to Georgia Code.Ann. § 40-6-25). The statutory scheme in this case
is substantially similar to the Georgia statutory scheme interpreted by the Supreme
Court. On the other hand, the longstanding common law duty in the State of Utah is that
railroads take reasonable precautions to reduce the risks posed by ultra-hazardous
crossings. See Bridges v. Union Pacific, 488 P.2d 738-40 (1971): English. 45 P. at 4750. This Utah common law duty is the same type of duty to which the Supreme Court
referred in Easterwood and found that railroads retain, despite the fact that a state or local
authority may be responsible for actually placing a warning device onto the highway.4

4

The U.S. Department of Transportation concurs, stating that it "has never . . .
abandoned] the com:* .on law of'joint responsibility' in favor of a scheme vesting in
States the exclusive a. ;> to provide adequate warning devices at grade crossings." (R.
at 867, 1022-24.) The Federal Railroad Administration ("FRA") agrees, stating that any
rule alleviating railroa^ from their duty to provide adequate warning at public crossings
will not best serve the public (R. at 1030; see R. at 867-68,1026.)
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The district court's definition of a railroad's scope of duty at ultra-hazardous
crossings does not make sense. According to the district court, a railroad's duty at an
ultra-hazardous crossing is confined only to abating dangerous conditions over which it
has control-such as trees, bushes, dirt mounds, and railroad cars. (R. at 1274.) This
conclusion is unsupportable because railroads, as owners or occupiers of property, have
a duty to abate unreasonably dangerous conditions in their control regardless of the ultrahazardous nature of a crossing. Schulz v. Ouintana. 756 P.2d 855. 856 (Utah 1978).
Utah law makes clear that a railroad's duties associated with an ultra-hazardous crossing
go beyond the general duty of occupiers or owners of property. According to the Utah
Supreme Court, "if, for any reason, devices employed at [a] crossing [are] rendered
inadequate to warn the public of the danger of an approaching train," a duty to take
"measures commensurate" with the risk at the crossing will attach. Duncan, 842 P.2d at
834. The district court simply imposed the wrong duty upon the Railroad Defendants.
In sum, because the Crossing is ultra-hazardous, the Railroad Defendants have a
duty to take measures to protect the public "commensurate with the risks" at the
Crossing. Defendants might have met this duty by issuing a slow order or special crew
instructions, installing lights and gates, or taking some equally effective action. Whether
the Railroad Defendants actually met this duty is a question of fact. Duncan. 790 P.2d at
598 ("The railroad is required to take precautions to prevent injury to crossing motorists
if a reasonable person in the railroad's position would take such precautions.") Because
the parties dispute whether the Railroad Defendants provided "commensurate measures,"
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summary judgment is simply inappropriate. Utah R. Civ. Pro. 56(c); Draper Citv v.
Estate of Bernardo> 888 P.2d 1097. 1100-01 (Utah 1995): Kitchen. 821 P.2d at 461: see
Wilde, No. C-83-149J, slip op. at 3 ("[I]f a fact finder determines that the conditions
around the grade crossing do render the warning employed at the Crossing . . .
inadequate to warn the public of danger, the fact finder is then in the position to
determine whether the railroad exercised reasonable care in running a train through the
Crossing without taking further precautions.").
B.

The District Court Erred In Holding that the Railroad Defendants
Had No Duty to Reduce the Train's Speed Over The Crossing.

The district court erred in holding that the Railroad Defendants did not have a
duty to slow the train's speed at the Crossing and that the Parents' excessive speed claim
was preempted by federal law. (R. at 1267-70.) To clarify the issues, the Parents do not
contend that the speed limit for the track was excessive or that the Railroad Defendants
should have lowered the track speed generally for the track. Instead, the Parents' claim
relating to train speed are two-fold: (1) the Railroad Defendants should have required the
train crew to reduce its speed over the Crossing because of the ultra-hazardous nature of
the Crossing; and (2) the train crew should have reduced its speed by braking once it
became concerned about the safety of the three approaching vehicles.
1.

The Railroad Defendants Had a Duty to Lower the Train Speed,

As discussed in the previous section, Utah law imposes upon railroads the duty to
take all necessary protective measures at ultra-hazardous crossings commensurate with
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the risks the crossing imposes upon the public. Walker. 844 P.2d at 341 n. 6. These
"commensurate measures," logically enough, include reducing a train's speed through a
slow order. See Wilde, C-83-149J. 1985 WL 17370 * 3 (railroad may issue slow order
to reduce risks at ultra-hazardous crossings). Because the district court failed to hold the
Railroad Defendants to this duty, the district court's order should be reversed. A jury
may then consider whether the Railroad Defendants breached their duty of care owed to
the Decedents by not issuing a slow order at the Crossing. Kitchen, 821 P.2d at 461.
This Court should also correct the district courts erroneous holding that under
CSX Transportation Co. v. Easterwood. 507 U.S. 658, 673-74 (1993) the Parents'
negligence claim based on the speed of the train is preempted by federal law. (R. at
1268-70.). In Easterwood, the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether the
FRA's regulations setting maximum track speeds preempted state negligence law
regarding excessive speed claims. 507 U.S. at 673-75.5 In reviewing the applicable
statute, 45 U.S.C. $ 434 (repealed 1994) and the FRA's regulations, the Easterwood

5

Although there is a maximum speed for a particular class of track, there is no
"federal speed limit" for railroad tracks. See 62 Fed. Reg. 36, 143 and 36, 144 (1997)
(discussing 49 C.F.R. Part 213 (regulations regarding track speed)). The FRA has stated
that "[notwithstanding some of the language in Easterwood that a cursory reading may
otherwise indicate, FRA has never assumed the task of setting train speed." Instead, a
railroad is free to set any speed it sees fit within the regulatory framework. 49 C.F.R. §
213.9. The only federal requirement concerning is that a railroad maintain the track in a
certain condition pursuant to FRA requirements to accommodate the speed that the
railroad sets. (Id) In this case, Defendants maintained the track to allow a "track
speed" of 80 mph, which means that the track must be maintained to certain standards
that will allow trains to operate at that speed. Despite the track speed, the railroads set a
lower, 70 mph speed, called "time table speed," for track at which trains actually run at.
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Court held that the regulations setting maximum track speeds precluded additional state
regulation on speed, including state tort law. 507 U.S. at 673-75.
However, Easterwood's holding does not give railroads the right to run their trains
at any speed regardless of the hazards. Under the current statutory framework:
A State may adopt or continue in force an additional or more stringent law,
regulation, or order related to railroad safety when the law, regulation, or
order-( 1) is necessary to eliminate or reduce an essentially local safety
hazard
49 U.S.C. S 20106 (1994): see also Easterwood 507 U.S. at 1743 n. 15. Thus, an
exception to federal preemption exists to eliminate or reduce an "essentially local safety
hazard." A "local safety hazard" is a hazard that "cannot be statewide in character and
cannot be capable of being adequately encompassed within uniform, national standards."
O'Bannon v. Union Pacific R.R.. 960 F. Supp. 1411. 1420-21 (W.D. Mo. 1997). Ultrahazardous crossings amply fit within the scope of this definition. For example, in Stone
v. CTX Transportation. 37 F. Supp. 2d 789, 796 (S.D.W.V. 1999), the court concluded
that a crossing at which the sight lines were poor and the warning devices were
ineffective would, as a matter of law, be considered a "local safety hazard."
As in Stone, the conditions of the Crossing alleged by the Parents to be ultrahazardous-the configuration of the Crossing, the high volume of high-speed trains using
the Crossing, and ineffective safety devices-render the Crossing a "local safety hazard."
These conditions are all specific to the Crossing and cannot be adequately addressed
within national standards. This type of local hazard is precisely the type envisioned by
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Congress to not be preempted. See also Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. Lemon, 861
S.W.2d 50L 510 (Tex. App. 1993) (no federal pre-emption pursuant to Easterwood
when visibility of a railroad crossing is obstructed).
Also, categorizing ultra-hazardous crossings under the "local safety hazard"
exception is good public policy and makes sense. Railroads should not be permitted to
run their trains at high speed through more than ordinarily hazardous crossings without
taking action to reduce those hazards. Utah law already recognizes this principle and
imposes upon railroads a duty of care to take all necessary protective measures at ultrahazardous crossings "commensurate with the risks" the crossing imposes upon the
public. This duty has already been interpreted to include reducing a train's speed. See
Wilde. C-83-149J. 1985 WL 17370 * 3. If ultra-hazardous crossings were not
recognized under the "local safety hazard" exception, and therefore speed claims for
accidents in such crossings were preempted, the possible "commensurate measures" to
be taken by a railroad would become quantitatively and qualitatively diminished.
The district court rejected the Parents' argument that the ultra-hazardous nature of
the Crossing constituted a "local safety hazard" because, according to the district court;
the FRA considers the adequacy of warning devices in determining the track
classification. (R. at 1270.) The Court's reasoning, however, is flawed. The district
court improperly focused on the FRA's purported consideration of the variations of the
warning devices. The Parents, however, are not claiming that the passive warning
devices by themselves constitute a "local safety hazard."
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Instead, it is the conditions of the Crossing that make the Crossing ultra-hazardous
with inadequate protection from or warning of those hazards that render the Crossing a
"local safety hazard." Regardless of the FRA's consideration of the "possible variations
of warning devices" in determining the track classification (R. at 1270), the FRA
certainly did not anticipate that those devices might be worn and improperly placed-as is
the case here. Instead, the FRA would have assumed that the warning devices were fully
operational. When warning devices, passive or active, do not function as intended, are
unreasonably worn, improperly placed, or otherwise rendered ineffective, those
conditions contribute to the hazard of an crossing. Moreover, there is no evidence in the
record indicating that the FRA was aware of the other conditions (visibility restraints,
etc.) that made this Crossing ultra-hazardous when setting the track speed.
In sum, an ultra-hazardous crossing may constitute a "local safety hazard" under
49U.S.C. § 20106. Accordingly, the district court improperly concluded that the
Parents' excessive speed claim was preempted by federal law. The issue of whether the
Railroad Defendants breached their duty by not ordering trains to reduce their speed over
the Crossing is a question of fact for a jury to decide. Kitchen, 821 P.2d at 461.
2.

The Crew Had the Duty to Brake Once Becoming Aware that
the Larrabee Vehicle Might Cross in Front of the Train,

The district court erroneously held that Amtrak's train crew had no duty to slow
or brake the train on approach to the Crossing before the collision. (R. at 1276-78.)
Under Utah law, a train engineer may generally assume that a person on or approaching a
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crossing will "exercise ordinary care and take reasonable precautions for his own safety."
Lawrence v. Bamberger R.R.. 282 P.2d 335, 338 (Utah 1955). However, this limited
duty of care will be expanded under certain circumstances.
First, Utah law recognizes that "[i]f... anything appears so that [the crew
operating the crane] either knows or should know that there is a likelihood of danger to a
person near the tracks, it becomes his duty to use all reasonable efforts to give warnings,
to slacken his speed, and if possible, to stop in time to avert an accident." Id.; see also
MUJI 8.4 (recognizing that a train crew has a duty to operate a train with reasonable
care); MUJI 8.3 (recognizing that a train crew has a duty to reduce the speed of the train
if it reasonably appears that a motorist is unaware of the approaching train); MUJI 8.5
(recognizing that a train crew has a duty to slow down if it concludes that a motorist is
not aware of the approaching train or is not going to yield the right-of-way).
The district court's grant of summary judgment was improper because there are
disputed issues of material fact as to when the engineers knew or should have known that
the Larrabee vehicle might try to cross the tracks infrontof the train and possibly be hit.
Utah R. Civ. Pro. 56 (c); Draper City. 888 P.2d at 1100 ("On a motion for summary
judgment, a trial court... sole inquiry should be whether material issues of fact exist.").
It was widely recognized that the Crossing was extremely hazardous because of its poor
sight lines. (See Section V, ^ 12.b.) Accordingly, a jury could determine that the train
crew should have know the cars might not be able to see it approaching the Crossing.
Moreover, Amtrak's train crew admitted that they believed well in advance of the
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Crossing that the approaching vehicles might drive in front of their train and get hit. If
anything, it is undisputed that the crew knew the Larrabee vehicle would cross infrontof
the train and possibly be hit. The train crew saw the three vehicles approaching in a
caravan well in advance of the Crossing and knew at least 1500 feet before the Crossing
that the cars' occupants might not be aware of the approaching train or might cross in
front of the train and be hit. (R. at 1006, Thornley Dep. at p. 53-56; R. at 1012-14,
Maxfield Dep. at p. 61-62.) If the train crew had remained vigilant and had applied safe
train handling methods, the collision might have been avoided. (R. at 1038-39, Byrnes
Aff.) Under these facts, a jury could reasonably find that the crew should have braked,
and therefore summary judgment was improper. Kitchen, 821 P.2d at 461.
Second, when a crossing is more than ordinarily hazardous, a train crew may not
assume that a motorist is able to see and hear the approaching train and will stop. See
MUJI 8.5. Thus, assuming that the Crossing was more than ordinarily hazardous, (see R.
at 1267, 1274), the train crew did not have, as a matter of law, the right to assume that
the Decedents were able to see and hear the approaching train and would stay stopped at
the Crossing. Instead, if the Crossing was ultra-hazardous, Amtrak had a duty to take all
"commensurate measures" to protect the public, including braking. Walker. 844 P.2d at
341 n.6. Because the district court misapplied the Railroad Defendants' duty of care,
summary judgment was improper.
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C.

The District Court Erred in Holding that Amtrak Did Not Have a
Duty to Provide Adequate Audible Warning of the Train's Approach.

The district court held as a matter of law that Amtrak had no duty to sound the
train's emergency whistle pattern when approaching the Crossing. In doing so, the
district court applied the wrong duty of care. Under Utah law, a train engineer may
generally assume that a person on or approaching a crossing will "exercise ordinary care
and take reasonable precautions for his own safety." Lawrence, 282 P.2d at 338.
However, "[i]f... anything appears so that [the crew operating the crane] either knows
or should know that there is a likelihood of danger to a person near the tracks, it becomes
his duty to use all reasonable efforts to give warnings, to slacken his speed, and if
possible, to stop in time to avert an accident." Id.
Thus, under Lawrence, if the crew suspected that the cars' occupants were
unaware of the train's approach, the train crew had a duty to "use all reasonable efforts"
to warn those individuals, which includes giving adequate audible warning with the horn.
Here, as discussed above, there exists a factual dispute of whether the crew knew or
should have known of the likelihood of danger to the Decedents. In fact, the train crew's
undisputed testimony is that they were concerned the vehicles might cross in front of
them and be hit approximately 1500 feet before the crossing. (See_Section V, Tf 8.)
From this testimony, a reasonable jury could find that the train crew knew or should have
known the Decedents were in danger. Moreover, Amtrak had a duty to take all measures
"commensurate with" the risks posed at the Crossing, including giving an adequate
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audible warning. Walker, 844 P.2d at 341 n. 6 Accordingly, the issue of whether the
crew breached its duty to use "all reasonable efforts to warn" and to take "commensurate
measures" by failing to give an adequate audible warning is a question of fact to be
decided at trial. See Schnuphase. 918 P.2d at 477: Kitchen. 821 P.2d at 461.
The district court improperly found that Amtrak had no duty to sound the train *s
whistle because "there [was] no evidence that the train was incapable of being seen." (R.
at 1275.) This is a misstatement and a misapplication of the law. Utah law does not
provide that a railroad's duty to "use all reasonable efforts to warn" or to take
"commensurate measures" is abrogated when a train is capable of being seen. Nor does
it make sense to. A train crew is in a poor position to judge whether the train can
actually be seen. However, they are in a good position to judge whether there is a
likelihood of danger to others near the track. It is that ability to determine a likelihood of
danger that should, and does, give rise to a railroad's duty to warn. See Lawrence, 282
P.2d at 338. In fact, the district court's rational for granting summary judgment because
the train could be seen is a resurrection of the "last clear chance" doctrine, which has
been abolished in Utah. Dixon v. Stewart. 658 P.2d 591. 598 (Utah 1982V If there is
evidence that the train could be seen, that evidence is relevant only to determine the
Decedents' comparative negligence; it will not affect Amtrak's duty or bar recovery. Id.
Even if the visibility of the train were relevant in determining whether a train must
give adequate audible warning, the district court's conclusion that "there is no evidence
that the train was incapable of being seen" is simply incorrect. There is ample evidence
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that the Amtrak train was not reasonably visible. The Crossing's configuration has a
"very bad crossing angle." (R. at 896.) This configuration provides "poor sight
distances" (id.) and make a driver's visibility of an oncoming train "deceptive and
difficult." (R. at 889-92, Burnham Aff.) Moreover, the occupants of the first car
testified that they came to a complete stop at the stop sign, looked both ways, and could
not see the train. (See Section V, ^ 5.) Brent Larrabee's own actions (i.e., pulling onto
the track after having stopped) are also evidence that the train was not reasonably
capable of being seen. (See Section V ^f 6.) The trial court erroneously ignored this
evidence when it granted summary judgement. Schnuphase, 918 P.2d at 477.
Finally, the Parents' claim that Amtrak failed to give adequate audible warning is
not preempted by federal law, as the trial court concluded. (R. at 1275-76.) First, only
the standards for horn equipment are preempted under the federal statutes and
regulations-not the use of whistles. For example, the Locomotive Inspection Act
49U.S.C. §§ 20701, et seg. (1997) preempts claims that the horn equipment was
inadequate. See First Sec. Bank v. Union Pacific R. Co., 152 F.3d 877, 880 (8th Cir.
1998). Furthermore, 49 C.F.R. § 229.129 establishes a federal minimum sound level for
audible warning devices on locomotives. These provisions, however, do not dictate
when and in what manner a train should sound its emergency whistle pattern.6 Those

6

49 U.S.C. § 20153 requires that a trains sound its horn "while each train is
approaching and entering upon each public-highway-rail crossing." Here, it is disputed
as to whether the train crew sounded its horn while approaching the Crossing. (See
Section V, % 24.)
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issues are left to state tort law. Lawrence. 282 P.2d at 338 (setting forth circumstances
which give rise to a duty of a train crew to use all reasonable efforts to give "adequate
warnings"); English. 45 P. 47. 49-50 (holding that statutes requiring trains to blow
whistles and sound horns "will not relieve the railroad company from adopting such
other reasonable measures for the public safety as common prudence may dictate, :
considering the danger, locality, travel, and surrounding circumstances"). Thus, it is
question of fact whether the train crew should have sounded the train whistle, whether it
did sound the whistle, and whether it did so as to give adequate warning.7
Second, this claim is not preempted by federal law by operation of 49 U.S.C. §
20jli2 which allows a state to adopt more stringent laws related to railroad safety,
including tort law, when that law "is necessary to eliminate or reduce an essentially local
safety hazard." As fully argued above, the Crossing constitutes a "local safety hazard"
because it was ultra-hazardous. Stone. 37 F. Supp. 2d at 796. Thus, state law designed to
protect the publicfromthose hazards is not preempted, including laws requiring railroads
to take protective measures commensurate with the risk at the crossing. Walker. 844
P.2d at 341 n.6. Moreover, a "local safety hazard" arises if the train crew knows or
should know that there is a likelihood of danger to an individual near the tracks. See
CTBannon. 960 F. Supp. at 1420 n. 10 (child in the roadway constitutes a "local safety

7

The proper whistle pattern to be used by trains approaching a railroad grade
crossing is set forth in the General Code of Operating Rules. (R. at 1041-47, 1994.)
When a train crew has reason to believe that a collision may occur, an emergency whistle
pattern is prescribed. (R. at 1038-39, Byrnes Aff.)
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hazard"). That is the case here. The railroad train crew knew that the vehicles were
traveling in a manner which indicated that they were not aware of the presence of the
train. The first vehicle in the caravan crossed the track directly in front of the train
confirming that the train was not plainly visible. Nevertheless, the engineer failed to
sound the train's emergency whistle pattern. (See. Section IV, ^| 10.) A jury must decide
whether the crew's failure to sound the train's emergency whistle pattern - - constitutes a
breach of Amtrak's duty.
D.

The District Court Erred In Finding that the City of South Jordan
Had No Duty To Upgrade The Warning Devices or Additional
Protection at the Crossing and Erred in Finding that the Existing
Warning Devices Were Adequate.

The district court held that the City, while having a duty to "exercise reasonable
care to warn travelers of potentially unsafe locations," had no duty to upgrade the
warning devices or take any other measure to protect the public at the Crossing. In
addition, ignoring ample evidence to the contrary, the district court found that the City's
warning devices were "adequate," thereby satisfying the City's duty. (R. at 1281-83.)
The district court erred on both counts. Initially, the court erred to defining the
scope of the City's duty. In Fishbaugh v. Utah Power & Light 969 P.2d 403. 406 (TJtah
1998}, the Utah Supreme Court addressed the scope of a municipality's duty to warn the
public of dangerous conditions on public streets. In particular, Fishbaugh addressed
whether a municipality has a duty to light its streets. While the court found that a
municipality has no duty to light its streets generally, it recognized that a municipality

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

SaltLake-114345.1 0027625-00001

39

has "the clear duty to maintain its streets reasonably safe for travel." Id. at 406. The
court also found that "[i]n conjunction with this duty, a municipality also has a duty to
warn of dangerous conditions on its streets." LdL; see 39 Am.Jur.2d § 397 ("It is the duty
of the responsible public authority to exercise reasonable care to warn travelers of
defects, obstructions, and unsafe places in its streets."). This duty requires a municipality
to provide "reasonably sufficient" warning to warn travelers of the hazardous condition,
and may encompass "various mediums, including the use of lights." Id. Thus, the court
concluded: "[a] duty to light, and the consequent liability for failure to do so, may ...
arise from some peculiar condition rendering lighting necessary in order to make the
streets safe for travel. Therefore, if there is a hazardous condition on the street requiring
lighting, a municipality would have the duty to light the street and to maintain such
lights. Id. (citation and quotation omitted.)
A municipalities' duty to provide "reasonably sufficient" warnings for dangerous
conditions equally applies at railroad crossings as it does for streets generally. The
Fishbaugh decision is clear: municipalities have the duty to warn of dangerous
conditions on streets. Thus, the relevant inquiry here is whether the City provided
"reasonably sufficient" warnings to warn the public of the dangers at the Crossing.
Although this is a question of fact for a jury to determine, it most likely could be
resolved on summary judgment-in the Parents9 favor! Contrary to the district court's
conclusions, there is ample evidence that the City did not provide "reasonably sufficient"
warnings, both in terms of maintaining the warning devices and in terms of the level of
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protection. The passive warning devices in place were worn, not legible, not fully
reflectorized, and improperly positioned so as to be not visible until a vehicle is at the
intersection. (R. at 889, 891, Burnham Aff.) Furthermore, as the chronology set forth
above demonstrates, the City has know since 1979 through the voluminous
correspondence with UDOT that the Crossing was ultra-hazardous and the level of
protection at the Crossing needed to be upgraded to lights and gates or close the crossing.
(See Section V,fflj14-18.) From 1979, UDOT has pleaded with the City to pay the
minimal amount (10% of the overall cost) to install lights and gates. The City, while
purporting to recognize the problem, has simply avoided correcting the problem for over
20 years. (Id)
For example, the 1989 Study recognizes that the Crossing is "substandard" and
proposes the installation of flashing light signals and gates. (R. at 908-10.) The 1989
Study specifically concludes: "There are only two alternatives. Do the rehabilitation or
do nothing. The do nothing alternative is unacceptable because existing protection is
inadequate." (Id. at 909 (emphasis added).) Time after time, UDOT attempted to get the
City to respond, but time after time the City refused to act. At one point, in June 1992,
the City agreed to place additional passive warning devices at the Crossing. (R. at 89698, Surveillance Review.) But, true to form, the City reneged on this pledge and did
nothing. (R. at 900; Miera Dep. at pp. 86-87.)
The Parents' assertion that the then-existing passive warning devices were not
"reasonably sufficient" to warn the public of the ultra-hazardous conditions at the
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crossing are also evidenced by the testimony of the occupants in the first vehicle. These
individuals testified that, having come to a complete stop and looking each way, they
could not see a train. (See Section V, % 5.) Brent Larrabee's own actions also evidence
this point. (See Section V, ^ 6.) From this, a jury reasonably could-and probably
will-conclude that the City did not provide "reasonably sufficient" warnings to the
public. Because the district court applied the wrong duty of care and ignored all of the
evidence that the warning devices were inadequate, this Court should reverse the district
court's order granting the City's motion for summary judgment.
E.

The District Court Erred In Striking the Affidavits of Archie
Burnham, Jr., Randy S. Hunter. Orlando Jerez, J. Clark Clenenden,
and Paul F. Byrnes.

The district court erroneously struck the affidavits of Archie Burnham, Jr., Randy
S. Hunter, Orlando Jerez, J. Clark Clenenden, and Paul F. Byrnes.8 (R. at 63-65.) Expert
affidavits submitted in opposition to a motion for summary judgment must comport with
both Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the Utah Rules of Evidence.
Accordingly, such affidavits must be made on personal knowledge, set forth such facts as
would be admissible in evidence, and show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to
testify to the matters stated in the affidavit. U.R.C.P. 56(e). Further, expert testimony, in
the form of opinion or otherwise, is admissible "if scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to

8

Regardless of the adequacy of these affidavits, there is sufficient evidence in the
record to reverse the district court's order.
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determine a fact in issue," provided the expert is qualified through knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education. Utah R. Evid. 702. The facts or data upon which an
expert bases an opinion or inference need not be admissible if they are of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field. Utah R. Evid. 703.
Under Utah law, an expert's affidavit must contain both the expert's opinion and
the specific facts that logically support that conclusion. Butterfield v. Okubo. 831 P.2d
97, 104 (Utah 1992 V Further, the expert must identify specific instances of negligence in
order for the expert's affidavit to comport with Rule 56(e). Id. at 105. An expert may
rely on hearsay and other inadmissible evidence in rendering an opinion. Utah R. Evid.
703; Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons. Inc.. 682 P.2d 832 (Utah 1984^): Gaw v. State Dept.
of Transp.. 798 P.2d 1130. 1137 (Utah App. 1990). For example, the court in Gaw
stated that an expert opinion contained in an affidavit, which was based on intersection
diagrams, police reports and photographs, the plaintiffs deposition and traffic court data,
was proper as the facts were of a type relied upon by engineers in the field of traffic
and/or highway design. 798 P.2d at 1137. Moreover, the expert can render opinions as
to the ultimate issue in the case. Utah R. Evid. 704; Gaw, 798 P.2d at 1137.
In Gaw, the court ruled that the trial court improperly struck the affidavits of
experts who opined that an intersection was inadequately designed. The court stated that
since the experts had identified particular aspects of the intersection and the surrounding
area which made the intersection misleading and dangerous, the affidavits contained
proper foundation. Gaw. 798 P.2d at 1137. n.9. The court also found that the affidavits
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were sufficient because they stated that the intersection's design was in conflict with
engineering practices. Id. Similarly, in Butterfield, the Utah Supreme Court found that
an expert affidavit was sufficient to create a factual issue where the affidavit outlined
specific facts from which the expert's theory of causation could be inferred. Butterfield,
831 P.2d at 106. The affidavits submitted by the Parents fully complied with these rules.
1.

Affidavit of Archie C. Burnham. Jr. (R. at 889-92).

The district court incorrectly concluded that the averments of Mr. Burnham in
paragraphs 8, 12, 13, and 14 were irrelevant and, accordingly, inadmissible. (R. at
1263.) As required by Butterfield, Mr. Burnham's affidavit contained conclusions
logically supported by specific facts. Mr. Burnham reviewed the accident report,
photographs, the Crossing's accident history, and the depositions and statements of the
affected parties. In addition, he conducted an on-site inspection and evaluation of the
Crossing. (See also R. at 1149-55.) His conclusions in paragraphs 12, 13, and 14 were
based on his review of these materials and his inspection. As stated in Gaw, this is the
type of information relied upon by experts in the field. Paragraph 8 properly set forth the
standard by which he analyzes the degree of hazard of a crossing, so that the finder of
fact understands the factors involved in his analysis. Mr. Burnham's analysis then
compared the traffic control devices in existence at the time of the accident against the
guidelines set forth in his Affidavit. Finally, based on his review of the above materials,
his own observations and inspection, his knowledge, training, and experience, and upon
well recognized and accepted engineering principles, he properly identifies specific
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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instances of negligence. Gaw. 798 P.2d at 1137. Consequently, his affidavit fully
complied with the rules set forth above and are admissible.
2.

Affidavits of Randv S. Hunter (R. at 998-1000) and Orlando
Jerez (R. at 1002-04).

The district court incorrectly concluded that the averments of Randy S. Hunter
and Orlando Jerez in paragraphs 6 and 8 of their affidavits constitute inadmissible
conclusions of law. (R. at 1263-64.) Mr. Hunter is the Liability and Litigation
Coordinator for UDOT. Mr. Jerez is the UDOT's Engineering Coordinator for Railroads
and Utilities. Paragraphs 6 and 8 of their affidavits did not constitute conclusions of law,
but were merely statements of fact within the particular knowledge of these experts due
to the nature of their respective positions. For example, paragraph 8 provides that the
railroad "is free to install proper and adequate train-activated flashers and gates at any
crossing it desires on its system at its own volition and expense." (R. at 1000 and 1004.)
This statement is factual and was averred based upon the affiants' personal knowledge
that railroads can and do actually install warning devices at their own expense. Thus, the
district court's order striking these affidavits must be reversed.
3.

Affidavit of J. Clark Clendenen CR. at 1032-33V

The district court incorrectly found that paragraphs 1, 2, and 4 of Mr. Clendenen's
affidavit were irrelevant and, accordingly inadmissible, and that paragraphs 3 and 5 of
the affidavit constituted inadmissible conclusions of law. (R. at 1264-65.) Contrary to
the district court's ruling, Mr. Cleneden averments were not irrelevant and did not
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purport to give legal conclusions. Rather, Mr. Clendenen's affidavit set forth some
duties of the trainmaster and some of the actions that can be taken by a trainmaster to
enhance safety at railroad crossings. The information was based on Mr. Clendenen's
personal knowledge and experience in the railroad industry as a career railroad
employee, locomotive engineer and train master. The affidavit identifies two specific
instances of negligence. Finally, Mr. Clendenen concludes that it is more likely than not
that the accident would not have happened had the trainmaster alerted train crews to the
dangers of this Crossing and initiated a head end slow order. These conclusions are
properly set forth in the affidavits under Utah law.
4.

Affidavit of Paul F. Bvrnes (R. at 1038-39).

The district court incorrectly found that the averments in Mr. Byrnes affidavit
constituted inadmissible conclusions of law or, in the alternative, were irrelevant and
therefore inadmissible. (R. at 1265.) In Paragraphs 4 and 5, Mr. Byrnes, a former
Amtrak locomotive engineer himself, concludes that Engineer Thornley had a duty to
control the speed of the train as he approached the Crossing and that it is more likely
than not that Engineer Thornely's failure to set the brakes caused or contributed to the
collision. These conclusions are logically supported by the facts stated in the affidavit, to
wit: Engineer Thornley was familiar with the intersection; three vehicles were traveling
together late at night on new years eve; the stated concerns of Engineer Maxfield as he
watched the three vehicles approach the grade crossing; and the expert's own knowledge
regarding braking response in passenger trains. The opinions were not hindsight, but
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR,4may
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were based upon the expert's knowledge of what a reasonably prudent engineer would
have done in the same or similar circumstances.
Furthermore, Paragraphs 6 and 7 are helpful to the trier of fact. As stated in the
affidavit, the General Code of Operating Rules, which governs Amtrak trains in this
situation, required the engineer to sound the proper emergency warning signal to
communicate the presence of the oncoming train. Paragraph 6 does nothing more that
identify a specific instance of negligence as required by Butterfield. supra. Paragraph 7
concluded that the failure to comply with this duty was the proximate cause of the
accident. The affidavit contained relevant averments which did not constitute
inadmissible conclusions of law.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

This Court should reverse the district court's order granting the Defendants'
motions for summary judgment because the district court imposed the wrong duties of
care upon the Defendants and ignored the disputed issues of material fact. The district
court erroneously restricted the Railroad Defendants' duty to warn of hazardous
conditions at railroad crossings. Utah law is clear that a railroad's duty is much broader
at ultra-hazardous crossings than the district court concluded. At such crossings, such as
the Crossing at issue, railroads have a duty to take measures to protect the public that are
commensurate with the risks posed at the crossing. There are a variety of actions a
railroad could take to satisfy this duty including, among others: installing automatic
lights and gates, postingflagmen,issuing a slow order, changing the configuration of the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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crossing, suspending use until the hazardous conditions are corrected, ordering crews to
use extra-precaution, sounding the emergency horn pattern, and braking when necessary.
Here, the Railroad Defendants took none of these measures to avoid the collision with
Brent, Jamie, and Aaron. Whether the Railroad Defendants breached their duty to take
"commensurate measures" by failing to take these actions is a question of fact for a jury
todecide.
In addition, if the train crew knew or should have known of the likelihood of
danger to Brent, Jamie, and Aaron, then the crew had the duty to "use all reasonable
efforts to give warnings and slacken . . . speed." Here, there is ample evidence in the
crew's own testimony that they knew the Decedents faced a likelihood of danger at the
Crossing. Whether they used all reasonable efforts to warn or to reduce their speed is a
question of fact for a jury.
Finally, the Court misapplied Utah law when defining and applying the scope of
the City's duty. Although the district court recognized that the City must "maintain its
streets in reasonably safe condition ad to exercise reasonable care to warn of unsafe
locations," the court misapplied this duty. A municipality has a duty to provide
"reasonably sufficient" warnings to warn the public of hazardous conditions on public
streets. In certain circumstances, this may include installing street lights, or, in the case
of ultra-hazardous railroad crossings, installing automatic lights and gates or taking some
similarly effective action. Whether the City breached this duty by failing to take
"commensurate measures" is a question of fact for the jury. In fact, there is sufficient
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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evidence that since 1979, the City has known that the Crossing was extremely hazardous,
known that the Crossing needed automatic lights if it were to stay open and operational,
and agreed that the dangerous conditions needed be corrected. Despite this, however, the
City did nothing. A jury should be allowed to decide whether the City's inaction
constituted a breach of its duty of care owed to Brent, Jamie, and Aaron.
For these reasons and those stated above, this Court should reverse the trial
court's order granting the Defendants' motions for summary judgement, and the matter
should be remanded to the district court to proceed to trial.

& day of January, 2000.
DATED this -LST

STOEL RIVES LLP

u

)avid J. Jordan
Mark E. Hindley
CORTEZ MACAULAY BERNHARDT
&SCHUETZELLC
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DANIEL D. PRICE, SUSANNE Q.
PRICE, KENT SWENSEN, KAY
SWENSEN, ROSS LARRABEE, and
CARMA LARRABEE,
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Plaintiffs,
Case No. 970903387WD
vs.
Honorable ANNE M. STIRBA
Court Clerk: Marcy Thorne
NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER
CORPORATION, SOUTHERN PACIFIC
TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, a
Delaware Corporation, and CITY
OF SOUTH JORDAN, a Utah
Municipal Corporation,

May 4, 1999

Defendants.

The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to
two motions for summary judgment against plaintiffs, Daniel D.
Price, Susanne Q. Price, Kent Swensen, Kay Swensen, Ross Larrabee,
and

Carma

Larrabee

(hereafter

collectively

referred

to

as

VN

plaintif f s." The railroad defendants in the case are National

Railroad

Corporation

(hereafter

referred

to as "Amtrak") and

Southern Pacific Transportation Company (hereafter referred to as
"Southern

Pacific")1

(Amtrak

and

Southern

Pacific

hereafter

'Southern Pacific Transportation Company was a corporate
entity that was a railroad. The Denver & Rio Grande Western
Railroad Company was a separate corporate entity that also was a
railroad. In approximately 1990 and through the relevant time
period, these two corporate railroads merged to do business as
Southern Pacific Lines. Thereafter these corporations were
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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collectively referred to as "railroad defendants'7) .
South Jordan
remaining

The City of

(hereafter referred to as "South Jordan")

defendant.

The

railroad

defendants

have

is the

moved

for

summary judgment and South Jordan has moved for summary judgment.
All of the defendants have moved to strike portions of one or more
of the affidavits filed by plaintiffs.
The Court heard oral argument with respect to all of these
motions on February 25, 1999.

However, on the day following oral

argument, February 26, 1999, plaintiffs requested that the Court
re-open the record to consider a supplemental memorandum entitled
"Plaintiffs' Supplement to Oral Argument in Opposition to Defendant
City of South Jordan's Motion for Summary Judgment."

-Based upon

plaintiffs'

record

request,

the

Court

did

re-open

the

for

consideration of plaintiffs' supplemental memorandum as well as
defendant South Jordan's responsive memorandum entitled "Defendant
South Jordan City's Response to Plaintiffs'

^Supplement to Oral

Argument,'" which was filed on March 10, 1999,

Thereafter, the

record was closed and the Court took the matter under advisement.
The Court, having now considered the motions, memoranda and
the good cause that has been shown, hereby enters the following

acquired by Union Pacific Railroad Company and no longer exist as
separate corporate entities. In this action, references made to
any of these three railroads pertain to defendant Southern
Pacific.
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ruling.
Undisputed Statements of Fact
At 11:30 p.m., on December 31, 1995, three teenagers, Brent
Larrabee, Jamie Swensen and Aaron Price
referred

to

as

"decedents")

(hereafter collectively

tragically

were

killed

when

the

automobile in which they were traveling was struck by the lead
locomotive of a train that was owned and operated by Amtrak.

The

railroad track at the site of the collision, 10200 South 300 West,
South Jordan, Utah, was then owned and maintained by Southern
Pacific.

Brent Larrabee was driving the automobile, and Jamie

Swensen and Aaron Price were passengers in the car.
The collision occurred where 10200 South crosses over Southern
Pacific's main line track west of Interstate 1-15.

A frontage

road, 300 West, parallels the track to the west between 10600 South
and 10200 South.

At 10200 South, 300 West makes an "S" turn by

turning right (east), crosses over the track, and then turns left
(north) and continues to run parallel to the track but on the east
side.
At the time of the collision, a stop sign, crossbucks and
advance stop and railroad crossing signs were posted for motorists
traveling from either direction to advise them of the existence of
the stop sign, track and intersecting road.

From the stop sign on

the west side of the crossing the railroad track to the south, the
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direction from which the Amtrak train was traveling, is straight
for more than one-half mile.
Railroad

grade

crossings

have

three

basic

levels

of

protection.

The lowest level of protection is known as "passive

protection"

and

consists

of

advance

warning

signs,

pavement

markings, railroad crossbuck signs and sometimes stop signs.

The

next level of protection is termed "active protection" and consists
of automatic flashing lights and sometimes automatic gates.

The

highest level of protection is a grade separation which consists of
either

an

overpass

or

an

underpass.

The

subject

crossing

constituted passive protection.
Passive protection is the lowest form of protection because it
only identifies the location of the railroad crossing.

Active

protection informs motorists not only that they are approaching a
railroad grade crossing but that a train is about to cross as well.
Grade

separation

is considered

the highest

form of

protection

because it eliminates all potential for collision.
At the time of the collision, decedents were the second of a
three-car caravan.

The first of the three cars, the Honda, had. its

windows up and the radio playing, and the three teenagers in that
car were talking as the Honda was driven toward the crossing.
The second car, the Tempo, contained the three decedents.
The third car, the Jeep, also was driven with its windows up
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and the radio playing, and the four teenagers in that car also were
talking as the Jeep was driven north on 300 West toward the stop
sign just west of the crossing.
The Honda came to a "rolling stop" at the stop sign just west
of the crossing and then drove across the track in front of the
approaching train, but safely making it to the other side of the
track.

9

The Tempo, occupied by the decedents, came to a complete stop
at the stop sign before crossing.
was only 50 feet to 300 feet
three

seconds

at

However, when the Amtrak train

(approximately one-half second to

68 miles per hour)

from the crossing,

Brent

Larrabee "slowly" drove the Tempo onto the track in front of the
train and his car was hit broadside.
Amtrak's train crew was aware of the three cars as they were
traveling on 300 South on the west side of the track.

The lead

locomotive's headlight was on bright.
The decedents' friends who were in the first and third cars
testified there were no obstructions between the railroad track and
300 West from 10600 South to 10200 South where the crossing is
located.

The track itself is higher in elevation than the public

road, increasing the visibility of the track.
The Amtrak train sounded its horn prior to the collision,
although the parties dispute precisely when in relation to the
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location of the grade crossing at 10200 South the horn sounded.
Motions to Strike
With their motions, defendants seek to strike a number of
plaintiffs' affidavits.

Firstf both the railroad defendants and

the South Jordan seek to strike the affidavit of Archie Burnham,
Jr. P.E., arguing that his statements constitute inadmissible legal
opinions, are vague and lack the requisite foundation.
Based upon review of the statements, and in light of the
analysis

below

regarding

duty

with

respect

to

the

railroad

defendants and the City of South Jordan, it is clear the averments
of Mr. Burnham are irrelevant, and accordingly, inadmissible.
The railroad defendants also seek to strike several other of
plaintiffs' affidavits. Considered in the order in which they were
briefed, the next motion to strike focuses on the affidavits of
Randy S. Hunter, the Liability and Litigation Coordinator for UDOT,
and Orlando Jerez, UDOT's Engineering Coordinator.

The railroad

defendants argue that these individuals render legal opinions which
are contrary to the Utah Supreme Court in Duncan v. Union Pacific
R.R. Co. , 790 P.2d 595, (Utah App. 1990), aff'd. , 842 P.2d 832 (Utah
1992) and are attempting to dictate the law to be applied in this
case.

The averments in the two affidavits themselves

remarkably similar language.

contain

Based upon the Court's review of the

two affidavits, it appears that the averments do state inadmissible
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Accordingly, the motions to strike these two

affidavits are granted.
Next, the railroad defendants take issue with the affidavit of
J. Clark Clendenen, arguing that his statements set forth legal
opinions as to what federal regulations do and do not require with
respect to train speed at crossings—something which Mr. Clendenen
is not qualified to do. Moreover, it is Amtrak's position that his
opinions regarding what may have occurred had the train gone slower
through the crossing are irrelevant.
Beginning with the first indented paragraph of the Clendenin
affidavit2 (referred to herein as "Paragraph 1")/ this paragraph,
as well as the second paragraph (referred to herein as "Paragraph
2"),

in

these

two paragraphs, Mr. Clendenen

opines

regarding

specific actions the trainmaster could have taken to prevent an
accident like this from happening.
below,

these

inadmissible.
fourth

statements

are

For the reasons set forth

irrelevant

and,

therefore,

This same reasoning applies with respect to the

paragraph

(referred

to

herein

as

"Paragraph

4").

Accordingly, the motion to strike Paragraphs 1, 2 and 4 is granted.
With respect to the third and fifth paragraphs (referred to
herein as "Paragraph 3" and "Paragraph 4", respectively), these
paragraphs

2

constitute

inadmissible

conclusions

of

law.

The paragraphs are not numbered.
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Accordingly, the motion to strike is granted.
Finally, with regard to the affidavit of Paul F. Byrnes, a
self-employed

railroad

operations

consultant,

the

railroad

defendants seek to strike his affidavit on the grounds that it
consists of legal opinions and lacks foundation.
Byrnes

testifies

To the extent Mr.

as to the legal duty the train engineer

had

regarding to slow or brake, the statements constitute inadmissible
conclusions of law and are stricken.

To the extent Mr. Byrnes

testifies that it is more likely than not that the engineer's
failure to set the brakes caused or contributed to the collision,
for

the

reasons

discussed

below

this

evidence

is

irrelevant.

Accordingly, the motion to strike is granted with respect to this
affidavit.
Standard of Review
A party is not entitled to summary judgment unless answers to
interrogatories

and

admissions

on

file,

together

with

the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as

a matter

Procedure.

of

law."

In reviewing

Rule

56©

of

the evidence

the

Utah

Rules

of

and determining

Civil

whether

genuine issues of material facts exist, a court must view all facts
and

inferences

nonmoving party.

therefrom

in "the

light most

favorable

to the

Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets, 918 P.2d 476,
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"On a motion for summary judgment, a trial court

should not weigh disputed evidence, and its sole inquiry should be
whether material issues of fact exist."

Draper Citv v. Estate of

Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Utah 1995).
The Railroad Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
Plaintiffs'

theories

of

liability

against

the

railroad

defendants are as follows:
(1)

Amtrak operated its train too fast at
this
crossing,
and Southern
Pacific
allowed Amtrak to operate Amtrak's train
too fast. Plaintiffs also allege Amtrak
should
not have
operated
its train
through the crossing at any speed because
of the "dangerous condition" of the
crossing, and Southern Pacific should not
have continued to use the crossing for
this
same
reason.
Plaintiffs
also
alleged that defendants failed to warn
train
crews
of the dangers
of the
crossing so they would go slower or
otherwise require trains to go slower
because of the dangers of this crossing;

(2)

Amtrak should have taken steps to correct
the unsafe condition at the crossing, and
Southern Pacific should have installed
"adequate and proper safety and warning
devices and protection for the crossing."
Specifically, plaintiffs contend
that
gates and flashing lights should have
been installed
at the crossing;

(3)

Amtrak failed to give "adequate warning"
prior to the collision. 3
Specifically,
plaintiffs claim that no bell or horn was

3

This claim is not made against Southern Pacific because its
train was not involved in the collision.
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sounded and flashing
were not installed;

For
concede

lights

(5)

Southern Pacific designed and constructed
the crossing in a way that created an
illusion that vehicular movement could be
performed safely and that obscured the
visibility
of
approaching
trains
to
motorists
approaching
the
crossing.
Plaintiffs also allege that the crossing
was not properly maintained. 5
More
specifically,
plaintiffs
claim
the
crossing is defective in the angle at
which the public road and railroad track
cross, the approach of the public road to
the crossing with the associated visual
clutter of background lights from nearby
Interstate 1-15, and the lack of active
protection (gates) to prevent motorists
from moving onto the track when there is
a train. There is no specific claim that
Southern
Pacific
failed
to
maintain
anything about its track or right of way.
of

this

motion,

in

the

a

timely

railroad

that this crossing was ultra-hazardous

DECISION

gates

Amtrak
failed
manner; 4 and

purpose

brake

and

(4)

the

to

MEMORANDUM

defendants

and needed

other

types of crossing warning devices.
A.

The Railroad's Duty to Lower Its Speed

As to plaintiffs' claim that the railroad defendants operated
or allowed operation of the train at an excessive

speed, Amtrak

4

This claim is not made against Southern Pacific because its
train was not involved in the collision.
5

This claim is not made against Amtrak because Amtrak did
not own the railroad track.
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contends it had no legal duty to operate its train slower than it
was traveling.
It is well-settled in Utah that trains have the preferred and
legal right of way at railroad grade crossings, and a driver
approaching a crossing is required to recognize the prior right of
the train.

Lundauist v. Kennecott Copper Co., Inc., 526 P.2d 1182,

1184 ( Utah 1972); Steele v. D. & R.G.W. R.R., 396 P.2d 751, 753
(Utah 1954); and Holmgren v. Union Pacific R.R., 198 P.2d 459, 461
(Utah 1948) .
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that trains must have
the preferred right of way at crossings because a heavy, cumbersome
train cannot physically stop on short notice or steer off the track
of a crossing to avoid a collision:
(b)ecause of the weight of the train, the
impossibility
of
stopping
within
short
distances, and the impossibility of turning to
avoid objects in its path, the same right of
way rule does not apply as in the case of two
automobiles. Trains cannot be stopped in time
to avoid collisions if the time interval is
shortened to a matter of... seconds ....
Van Wagoner v. Union Pacific R.R.,

186 P.2d 293, 300-01

(Utah

1947) .
The rule that railroads have the right of way at railroad
crossings is codified in Utah at Section 41-6-93 U.C.A. (1953), as
amended, making it unlawful for a motorist to drive upon or across
the tracks or the path of a train whenever the train has started to
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cross an intersection.

v

It is undisputed in this case that in this section of track
the federally-established speed limit was 80 miles per hour and the
train was traveling at no more than 68 miles per hour.

Although

railroads may set their own speed limit for its track below the
federal speed limit, the United States Supreme Court has held that
railroads have no legal duty to operate slower than the maximum
limit set for the "class of track" on which they operate."
Transp. Co. V. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 673-74 (1993).

CSX

Any claim

that Amtrak was operating its train too fast, when it was being
operated below the federal speed limit, is preempted by federal
law.

.Id. Moreover, this federal preemption applies to bar states

from allowing plaintiffs the right to recover in a lawsuit.
at 673-675.

Id. ,

Further, there is no exception to this preemption for

train speed at railroad grade crossings, pursuant to 62 Fed. Reg.
36143-44 (1997), which states, in pertinent part, that the Federal
Railroad Administration's

("FRA") "current regulations governing

train speed do not afford any adjustment of train speeds...at grade
crossings...."
The only exception to preemption of a plaintiff's speeding
claim is when there is "an essentially local safety hazard" that
requires a state law standard that is "not incompatible" with the
federal

standard.

Id.

Plaintiffs

contend

that
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inadequacy of warning devices at the subject crossing in this case
constitutes an "essentially local safety hazard" which justifies an
exception to preemption.

However, in promulgating its federal

speed limit at any given crossing, the FRA considers all of the
possible variations of warning devices for specific crossings. See
Thompson v. CSX Trans., Inc..

F.Supp.

(S.D.Miss. 1998);

Bowman v. Norfolk S.Rv., 832 F.Supp. 1014, 1018
Thus,

a claimed

inadequacy

(D.S.C. 1993).

of a "warning device employed

at a

crossing is considered in the context of setting the federal speed
limit and does not then also constitute "an essentially

local

safety hazard."
In the absence of "an essentially local safety hazard, there
is no exception to federal preemption.

Where the federal speed

limit prevails and a railroad operates its train within that speed
limit, a railroad has no duty to operate the train slower.

In this

case, because it is undisputed that the train was operating at a
speed no greater than 68 miles per hour in a federally-approved 80
mile per hour area, the train's speed was well within approved
limits.

As a matter of law, therefore, the train's speed of 68

miles per hour was reasonable.
B.

The Railroads' Duty to Upgrade the Warning Devices

As to plaintiffs' claim that Amtrak should have taken steps to
correct the unsafe condition at the crossing and that Southern

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"adequate

and proper

safety

and

warning devices and protection for the crossing," the railroad
defendants claim that they had no duty with respect to the safety
of the subject crossing.
For obvious reasons, all railroad crossings are inherently
dangerous.

Thus, the presence of a railroad track in itself is a

"warning of danger" and places a motorist on notice that a train
may be present or in hazardous proximity to the crossing at any
time.

Lundauist v. Kennecott Copper Co.,. 516 P. 2d at 1184.
Historically,

the

railroads

did

have

adequate warning devices at their crossings.
Pacific Railroad, 488 P.2d 738
Co. , 45 P.47

(1896).

a

duty

to

provide

Bridges v. Union

(1971); English v. Southern Pac.

However, under Utah's current

statutory

scheme, the railroads no longer have a responsibility for designing
railroad crossings and highway intersections

or regulating

the

travel of motorists on roads and highways which pass over railroad
tracks.

Rather,

the

exclusive

responsibility

for

designing

railroad crossings and highway intersections and regulating the
travel of motorists on roads and highways which pass over railroad
tracks lies with the Utah Department of Transportation
Section 54-4-14 et, seq.6; Duncan supra.

6

("UDOT").

As stated in Duncan,

Section 54-4-15.1 (1992) specifically provides that
(t)he Department of Transportation so as to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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...(I)t is not, however, the responsibility of
the railroad to place signs and devices on the
public road. The railroad must maintain its
own right of way, but it is not under any duty
to place signs or devices on the public road.
The design and maintenance of state roads
and the control of traffic on state roads are
UDOT's responsibilities
and prerogatives.
[Footnote omitted.] At common law, this
responsibility at railroad crossings was
shared with the railroad. [Footnote omitted.]
Thus, in English,7 the railroad was found
liable for failing to flag motorists on an
intersecting city street, Since English,
however, UDOT has been established, and the
Legislature invested UDOT with ^power to
determine
and
prescribe
the
manner...of...protection of each crossing.'
[Footnote
omitted.]
Although
that
responsibility
in
no
way
reduces
the
railroad's responsibility to maintain its
right of way [footnote omitted], it would
nevertheless, under ordinary circumstances,
place the railroad in the role of meddler,
trespasser, or usurper if the railroad were to
put signs on the public road or forbid traffic
on the public road from crossing its right of
way.

promote the public safety shall as prescribed
in the act provide for the installing,
maintaining, reconstructing, and improving of
automatic and other safety appliances, signals
or devices at grade crossings on public
highways or roads over the tracks of any
railroad or street railroad corporation in the
state.
Section 54-4-15(2) (1993) also provides that UDOT has the power to
determine and prescribe the manner of protection of railroad
crossings.
7

English v. Southern Pac. Co., 4 5 P.4 7 (18 96).
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790 P.2d at 599-60.
Thus, under Utah law, even at a railroad crossing that is
more than ordinarily hazardous, railroads have no legal duty to
change or upgrade

the design or configuration of the crossing

intersection of the warning devices.8
Plaintiffs contend that notwithstanding the Utah statutory
scheme, the railroad defendants had a joint responsibility with
UDOT to install flashing lights and gates at the crossing, relying
on CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658

(1993),

which had before it a case out of Georgia in which prevailing state
law continued to recognize, as do many states, the common law duty
historically imposed on railroads.
n.5.

Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 665

However, the issue in Easterwood was federal preemption of

that common law duty, an issue not raised in the instant case.
Easterwood did not address the question, which is present in this
case, as to whether, in the context of a state statutory scheme
which vests exclusive responsibility for crossing design with state
government, a railroad nevertheless continues to have a historical
common
scheme.

law

shared

duty,

thus

undermining

the

state

statutory

Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that federal law has

8

In addition, because Amtrak was merely operating its train
over the track and did not own it, for this additional reason
Amtrak has no legal duty to change or upgrade the railroad
intersection or warning devices at the intersection.
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Thus, in Utah, the entity solely

responsible for railroad crossing design is UDOT.

Accordingly, as

a matter of law the railroad defendants had no duty to provide or
promote the installation of active warning devices at the subject
railroad crossing.
What,
crossings?

then,

is

the

duty

of

railroads

at

ultra-hazardous

Where a crossing is more than ordinarily dangerous, as

the railroad defendants concede for the purpose of this motion, a
railroad is liable for those conditions over which it has ownership
or control.

Duncan v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 790 P.2d 595, 598

(Utah App. 1990), aff'd., 842 P.2d 832 (Utah 1992). 9

Thus, trees,

bushes, dirt mounds, other railroad cars, structures and other
similar obstructions to view or sound caused or created by the
railroad or allowed by the railroad on railroad right of way or
property is its responsibility to abate.

Jd.

Thus, the railroad

defendants have a duty to abate dangerous conditions it has created
or allowed on the railroad right of way or property.

In this case,

there is neither a claim nor evidence to support a claim that the
railroads created or allowed a dangerous condition on the railroad

9

In Duncan, the plaintiffs sought damages for negligence
against the railroad by asserting that the warning devices
employed at a particular cross were inadequate. Summary judgment
for the railroad was granted by the trial court and affirmed by
the Court of Appeals. 790 P.2d 595 (Utah App. 1990). The Utah
Supreme Court also affirmed. 842 P.2d at 832.
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Thus, the railroad defendants are

entitled to summary judgment on this issue as a matter of law.
C.

Amtrak's Duty to Give "Adequate Audible Warning"
of the Train's Approach

Plaintiffs claim that Amtrak failed to give "adequate audible
warning" prior to the collision.10

Specifically, plaintiffs claim

that Amtrak was negligent by failing to blow an emergency whistle
pattern when the train crew had reason to believe that a collision
might occur.11
The difficulty with plaintiffs' claim on this point is, first,
that

in

this

case,

there

is

no

evidence

that

the

train

was

incapable of being seen, particularly when it was as close to
decedents' automobile as it was when the automobile was stopped at
the

stop

sign.

Further,

plaintiffs

have

failed

to

cite

to

authority for their claim that because the crossing was more than
ordinarily dangerous the train crew was obligated to sound its
emergency whistle pattern. Finally, plaintiffs' argument overlooks
the fact that train horns and signaling are governed by federal law
and, thus, plaintiffs' claims that the horn should have been blown

10

This claim is not made against Southern Pacific because
its train was not involved in the collision.
11

There is no dispute that several witnesses actually heard
the train's horn prior to the collision and that the train's data
event recorder established that the train had sounded its horn at
different intervals along the track.
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20702; 49 C.F.R. Section 229.129
Union v. Foster,

F.Supp.
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49 U.S.C. Sections 20153 and

(1995).

United Transportation

1998 U. S. Dist .Lexis

14576

(E.D.La.); see also First Security Bank v. Union Pacific R.R., 152
F.3d 877,880 (8th Cir. 1998).
D.

Amtrak failed to brake in a timely manner.

Plaintiffs claim that Amtrak
manner.

failed to brake in a timely

Amtrak has moved for summary judgment on this claim on the

ground there was no duty on its part for the engineer to apply the
train's brakes until Brent Larrabee, after stopping the car in
front of the tracks, proceeded onto the tracks, at which time it
was too late for the train to avoid a collision.
In Utah, an engineer operating a train may assume, and act in
reliance on the assumption, that a person on or approaching a
railroad crossing is in possession of his natural faculties and
aware of the situation, including the fact that a train is a large
and cumbersome instrumentality and is difficult to stop, and will
exercise ordinary care and take reasonable precautions for the
driver's own safety.

Lawrence v. Bamberger R.R., 282 P.2d 335, 338

(1955) . The duty to take reasonable efforts to stop a train arises
only when the engineer knows or should know that a person's life or
property is in danger and that the person does not intend or is
unable to meet the duty to avoid the train.

Id.

Train crews are

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

m one.

PRICE v. NATIONAL RAILROAD

Page 20

MEMORANDUM DECISION

not obligated to speculate as to what a motorist will or will not
do.

Indeed,

because

of

dangers

to

railroad

passengers

and

increased risks of derailments associated with unexpected braking,
trains are not obligated to slow or brake merely because a person
is observed on or near the track.

Power v. Union Pacific Railroad

Co. , 655 F.2d 1380, 1384 (9th Cir. 1981).
Applying the legal standard to the undisputed facts of this
case, Amtrak is entitled to summary' judgment as a matter of law on
this issue.

The undisputed evidence is that the Tempo, which was

driven by Brent Larrabee, came to a complete

stop before

the

railroad crossing with the train only 50 to 300 feet from the
crossing, traveling at a speed of 68 miles per hour., which is
approximately 100 feet per second.

The track to the south from

where the train was coming was straight for over one-half mile
away.

The track was elevated.

sounded its horn.

The train was very large.

It

The warning signs were in place and visible the

night of the collision.
Because the Tempo had stopped, there was no basis for the
train to justify applying its emergency brakes, and it was only
when the Tempo started across the track that the engineer knew or
should have known that Brent Larrabee might illegally enter onto
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Indeed, after applying its

emergency brake, the train traveled approximately a third of a mile
before coming to a stop.
Based upon the foregoing, Amtrak had no duty to slow or apply
its emergency brake until the Tempo drove onto the track, at which
time it was too late for the collision to be avoided.

Accordingly,

on this issue, Amtrak is entitled to summary judgment.
E.

Plaintiffs

Southern Pacific's Duty to Alter the
Design of the Intersection
claim

that

Southern

Pacific

designed

and

constructed the crossing in a way that created an illusion that
vehicular movement could be performed safely and that obscured the
visibility
crossing.

of approaching

trains

to motorists

approaching

the

Southern Pacific has moved for summary judgment on this

issue on the ground that there is no evidence that Southern Pacific
designed the subject intersection, that Southern Pacific's right of
way

and

track

were

in

good

operating

condition

and

that

no

obstructions existed on its right of way.

Plaintiffs argue that the Amtrak crew was concerned,
because it was New Year's Eve, about whether the motorists in the
three cars were aware of the approaching train as the vehicles
crossed 10600 South and were being driven toward the 10200 South
crossing. However, notwithstanding this concern, which
constituted nothing more than speculation, there is no evidence
that the crew knew or should have known that any of the motorists
were unaware of the train. The mere fact that the motorists were
in the vicinity of the train is insufficient to raise a duty to
slow or brake. Lawrence v. Bamberger R.R., supra, 282 P.2d 335.
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not

come

forward

with

any

evidence that Southern Pacific was involved in the designing or
constructing

of the

subject

crossing.

Moreover,

there

is no

specific claim that Southern Pacific failed to maintain anything
about its "right of way" or track.13
Plaintiffs
maintained.14

allege

that

the

crossing

was

not

properly

More specifically, plaintiffs claim the crossing is

defective in the angle at which the"public road and railroad track
cross and that the crossing is somewhat obscured by visual clutter
of background lights from nearby Interstate 1-15.
However, this claim is without merit because under Utah law,
a railroad cannot be held liable merely because a public road and
railroad track intersect.

Duncan v. Union Pac. R.R,, 842 P.2d 832,

833 (Utah 1992).

Further, there is no duty to eliminate railroad

crossings.

Implicit under this reasoning is that there is

JEci.

also no duty to re-design public crossings to alter the angles in
which roads and railroad tracks intersect.
Based upon the foregoing, Southern Pacific is entitled to
summary judgment, and its motion for summary judgment is hereby

1J

Plaintiffs have demonstrated nothing about Southern
Pacific's "right of way" which constituted a greater hazard than
that which existed because it constituted an intersection.
14

This claim is not made against Amtrak because Amtrak did
not own the railroad track.
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granted.
South Jordan's Motion for Summary Judgment
Plaintiffs claim that the City of South Jordan is liable
because it was negligent in failing to install or maintain advance
warning

signs, painted

pavement markings, flashing

lights

and

crossing gates at the subject crossing, that it maintained improper
signs at the crossing, that it failed to properly design, construct
and maintain the crossing, or, in the alternative, that it should
have closed the crossing.
In

its motion

for

summary

judgment,

South

Jordan

argued

summary judgment was appropriate because (1) the notice of claim
filed

by

-plaintiffs

was

not

provided

to

the

appropriate

individuals: namely, the city council and the city mayor or city
manager; (2) South Jordan owed no duty to plaintiffs; and (3) South
Jordan is immune from suit under the Governmental Immunity Act,
Section 63-30-1 ejt seq., (1953), as amended.
Addressing first the notice of claim filed by the plaintiffs,
pursuant to Section 63-30-13 U.C.A. (1954):
A claim against a political subdivision, or
against its employee for an act or omission
occurring during the performance of the.
employee's
duties, within
the
scope of
employment, or under color of authority, is
barred unless notice of claim is filed with
the
governing
body
of
the
political
subdivision according to the requirements of
Section 63-30-11 within one year after the
claim arises....
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sent

a

notice

of

claim

by

certified mail to the "City of South Jordan and South Jordan City
Council," within the one-year time frame and that the contents of
the notice satisfied the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11
U.C.A.

(1998).

What South Jordan argues is that plaintiffs were

required to serve the "governing body" and in this case that would
be the city council and either the "mayor and/or the city manager.
In opposing this argument of defendants, plaintiffs note the
term "governing body," for a city of the third class, such as South
Jordan, is defined in Section 10-1-104(3) U.C.A. (1997) as the city
council.

Furthermore, plaintiffs point out that Section 10-3-105

U.C.A. (1997) states that
[t]he governing body of cities of the third
class shall be a council composed of six
members, one of whom shall be the mayor and
the remaining five shall be council members.
Accordingly, it is plaintiffs' position that in serving the
South Jordan City Council it fully complied with the mandates of
Section 63-30-13.

With this the Court agrees.

Turning next to the issue of whether South Jordan had any duty
to the decedents, it should be noted that pursuant to Fishbauah v.
Utah Power & Light, 353 UAR 20 (1998), South Jordan has a duty to
maintain its roads in a reasonably safe condition and to exercise
reasonable care to warn travelers of potentially unsafe locations,
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any particular traffic control device.
834 P.2d 556 (Utah App. 1992).

Jones v. Bountiful City,

Indeed, all that is required is

that once the municipality takes action install such devices, it
must do so in a non-negligent manner and maintain the traffic
control devices in a reasonably safe and visible condition.
In the instant

case, although plaintiffs

Id.

claim the paint

markings at the crossing were faded and not legible and that the
stop sign was not properly maintained, it is undisputed the signs
accomplished

their

job.
that

Each

of

the

they

knew

surviving

they

were

drivers

at

a

and

passengers

testified

railroad

crossing.

Indeed, even Brent Larrabee brought the Tempo to a

complete stop prior to entering upon the tracks.
Moreover, at the time the Tempo was stopped in front of the
crossing, the train was only 50 to 300 feet from the crossing and
capable of being observed on the track.

Passengers in the third

vehicle saw the train and watched it for some time.

Their view,

which was even behind the Tempo, was so unobstructed that they saw
the first car drive over the track, at which point the train was
close enough to illuminate the side of the car with its headlight.
In sum, the purpose of the warning devices at the crossing was
to warn motorists and others of the existence of the railroad
crossing

(not

the

approach

of

a

train) , at

which
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the duty to stop, look

and

listen

The warning devices were sufficient to accomplish

objective,

and

it

is

therefore

clear

that

South

complied with its duty to provide an adequate warning
Indeed,

for an

the undisputed

evidence

indicates

that

Brent

Jordan
system.

Larrabee

responded by stopping as a result of such devices.
Plaintiffs contend that UDOT had approved the crossing for the
installation of an active warning system and that, therefore, South
Jordan had a duty to upgrade the crossing.

However, this argument

overlooks the fact that the project was never funded.

Further,

South Jordan had no authority to order UDOT to supply the money,
see Duncan, 842 P. 2d at 834, nor did UDOT have the power to require
South Jordan to provide the requisite funds.
Based upon the foregoing, South Jordan is entitled to summary
judgment.
Because South Jordan had no duty to upgrade the crossing and
because it adequately warned decedents of the existence of the
crossing,

the Court

does not

reach

the

issue

of

governmental

immunity.
Based upon the forgoing, South Jordan's Motion for Summary
Judgment is granted.
Pursuant

to

Rule

4-504

of

the

Utah

Code

of

Judicial

Administration, counsel for the railroad defendants shall prepare
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an order consistent with this Memorandum Decision.
DATED this 4th day of May, 1999.
BY THE COURT

i^§0A
ANNE M. STIRBA >,.
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
DANIEL D. PRICE, SUSANNE Q. PRICE,
KENT SWENSEN, KAY SWENSEN,
ROSS LARRABEE and CARMA
LARRABEE,
Plaintiffs,

ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND TO
STRIKE AFFIDAVITS
SUBMITTED BY PLAINTIFFS

vs.
NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER
CORPORATION AND SOUTHERN
PACIFIC TRANSPORTATION COMPANY
and CITY OF SOUTH JORDAN,

Case No. 970903387WD
Honorable Anne M. Stirba

Defendants.

Defendants' motions for summary judgment and motions to strike the affidavits
submitted by plaintiffs in opposition to defendants' motions for summary judgment
came before the Court for hearing on February 25, 1999. Plaintiffs were represented
by Robert A. Schuetze and David J. Jordan. Defendants National Railroad Passenger
Corporation and Southern Pacific Transportation Company were represented by Casey
K. McGarvey, and defendant City of South Jordan was represented by Allan L. Larson.
Having considered oral arguments and all memoranda and evidence submitted by the
parties on these motions, including memoranda pertaining to plaintiffs' supplement to
oral argument filed after the February 25th hearing, and having entered its
Memorandum Decision of May 4, 1999, and for good cause shown,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendants' motions to strike are granted. The
following affidavits are hereby stricken.
1.

Archie Burnham, Jr. P.E., in total.

2.

Randy S. Hunter, paragraphs 6-8.

3.

Orlando Jerez, paragraphs 6-8.

4.

J. Clark Clendenen, in total.

5.

Paul F. Byrnes, paragraphs 4, 5, 6 and 7.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants' motions for summary judgment are
granted, and that judgment be entered in favor of defendants and against plaintiffs, no
cause of action, with prejudice and on the merits.
•ih
DATED this £% "day of May. 1999.

BY THE COURT:

ANNE M. STIRBA
District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Robert S. Schuetze
David J. Jordan
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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'£&!
Casey K., McGarvey

' ^J^VVXA^

Attorneys for Defendants
National Railroad Passenger Corporation and
Southern Pacific Transportation Company

(U&^

Allan L. Q
Attorney for Defendant
City of South Jordan
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FRED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

ALLAN L. LARSON (A1896)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant City of South Jordan
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5000
Telephone: (801)521-9000

SALT Itae COUNTY

*Deputy Clwfc

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

DANIEL D. PRICE, SUSANNE Q.
PRICE, KENT SWENSEN, KAY
SWENSEN, ROSS LARRABEE and
CARMA LARRABEE,

JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL
OF CITY OF SOUTH JORDAN

Plaintiffs,
vs.
NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER
CORPORATION, SOUTHERN PACIFIC
TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, and
CITY OF SOUTH JORDAN,

Civil No. 970903387WD
Judge Anne M. Stirba

Defendants.

The City of South Jordan's Motion for Summary Judgment and to Strike Affidavit came
on regularly for hearing on February 25, 1999. The plaintiffs were represented by Robert A.
Schuetze and David J. Jordan, the defendants National Railroad Passenger Corporation and
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Southern Pacific were represented by Casey K. McGarvey, and the defendant City of South Jordan
was represented by Allan L. Larson. Having considered oral arguments and all memoranda and
evidence submitted by the parties, and the Court having previously entered its Memorandum
Decision and Order granting the City of South Jordan's Motion for Summary Judgment, and for
good cause appearing, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:
L

Plaintiffs' claims as against the defendant City of South Jordan are hereby dismissed

with prejudice and upon the merits, and plaintiffs' Complaints and Amended Complaints as
against the City of South Jordan are hereby dismissed with prejudice; and
2.

Judgment is hereby entered in favor of the defendant City of South Jordan and

against the plaintiffs and each of them, no cause of action, each of the parties to bear their own
costs incurred.
DATED this

day of May, 1999.
BY THE COURT:

-77

Anne M. Stirba, District Court Judge ,T=. .
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APPROVED AS TO FORM:

DATED this XT

day of May, 1999.

CORTEZ MACAULAY BERNHARDT & SCHUETZE, LLC

By

" >„
' Robert A. Schuetze
Attorneys for Plaintiff

DATED this f/Ct day oO&ay, 1999.
STOEL RIVES

David J. Jordan
Mark E. Hindley
Attorneys for Plaintiff

DATED this 2Q

day of May, 1999.

BERMAN, GAUFIN, TOMSIC & SAVAGE

ByCasey K. McGarvey
Attorneys for Railroad Defendants

DATED this

of May, 1999.

SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

By.

^/LA^S.A— —

Allan L/Tarson
Attorneys for Defendant City of South Jordan
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APPROVED AS TO FORM;

DATED this 2£

day of May, 1999.

CORTEZ MACAULAY BERNHARDT <fc SCHUETZE, LLC

•

^

ibert A. Scbuetze
Attorneys for Plaintiff

DATED this

day of May, 1999.

STOEL RIVES

ByDavid J. Jordan
Mark E. Hindley
Attorneys for Plaintiff

DATED t h i s ^ M . day of May, 1999.
BERMAN, GAUFIN, TOMSIC & SAVAGE

Rv O&9J/I,

£ V>J

Casey iC. McGarvcy

Attorneys for Railroad Defendants

DATED this

day of May, 1999.

SNOW. CHRISTENSEN & MARTtNEAU

B y ^
Allan L. Larson
Attorneys for Defendant City of Souxh Jordan
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APPROVED AS TO FORM:

DATED this 2 ^ d a v of May, 1999.
CORTE^ACAULAY BERNHARDT ft SCHUETZE, LLC

fly-

Ruben A. Schuctze
Attorneys for Plaintiff
DATED this

day of May, 1999.

STOELRIVES

ByDavid J. Jordan
MarkE-Hindley
Aitoraeys for Plaintiff

DATED this

day of May, 1999.

HERMAN, GAUHN, TOMSIC ft SAVAGE

' / C a s e y K.McGarvey
Anameys for Railroad Defendams

DATED this

day of May, 1999.

SNOW, CHRISTENSEN ft MARTINEAU

By.
Allan L. Larson
Anoroeys for Defendant Ciry of South Jordan
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APPROVED AS TO PQW*
DATED

tins

day <rf May. 19B9.

CaRT^rtjACAULAY BERNHARDT ft SCHDEIZE. LLC

By
Rohen A. SamttB
Asanas fi* PfcUanff
iris _ \ _dayofM<yv IS"*.

DAIED

STDEL RIVES

By.

D*vidJ..Jordtt

!)

ABOcwys ftr Flaionff

KERMAN. GAUFW. TQMSC & SAVAGE

By.

Casey J£-McG«rvcy
Axxorays

DATED this

day of May* 1599.

SNOW, CHBIST£N5£N & MARTWEAU

By.—

£S.«-—o*-**1—
*

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TabD

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

•WSRSP
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE C™ ,K'™
STATE OF UTAH
DANIEL D. PRICE, SUSANNE Q. PRICE,
KENT SWENSEN, KAY SWENSEN,
ROSS LARRABEE and CARMA
LARRABEE,

W i^ t COUNTY
'

JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL
Case No. 970903387WD

Plaintiffs,

Honorable Anne M. Stirba

vs.
NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER
CORPORATION AND SOUTHERN
PACIFIC TRANSPORTATION COMPANY
and CITY OF SOUTH JORDAN,
Defendants.

Plaintiffs in this action were represented by David J. Jordan of Stoel Rives LLP
and Robert A. Schuetze of Cortez Macaulay Bernhardt & Schuetze LLC. Defendants
National Railroad Passenger Corporation and Southern Pacific Transportation
Company were represented by Casey K. McGarvey of Berman, Gaufin, Tomsic,
Savage & Campbell. Defendant City of South Jordan was represented by Allan L.
Larson of Snow, Christensen & Martineau. Having entered its Memorandum Decision
and Order granting defendants' motions for summary judgment, and good cause
appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1.

Plaintiffs' claims against defendants, National Railroad Passenger

Corporation, Southern Pacific Transportation Company and City of South Jordan, are
-1Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

0132

hereby dismissed with prejudice and on the merits.
2.

Judgment is hereby entered in favor of defendants, National Railroad

Passenger Corporation, Southern Pacific Transportation Company and City of South
Jordan, and against plaintiffs, Daniel D. Price, Susanne Q. Price, Kent Swensen, Kay
Swensen, Ross Larrabee and Carma Larrabee, no cause of action, andjdefendants are
cmMs*€\tiA fe>4«UM C U M * \r+Kco±kr #
awarded their costs incurred in this action as allowed by low Qncrto bo inoortorl intn tbis prtt^y/
judgment hQwaftpr in arrnrdanpe yyith Rule 54 of the I Itflh Ri lies of Civil Pj&e&k&e. in
4fre-bjank3 providMiorJ^o^

——

' 1 NationaTR§rttr©ad^assenger Corporation

$

Southern Pacific Transportation Q
City of South Jordan
3.

Each party shall bear their own attorney's fees.

DATED this H ^ day offetay,1999.
BY THE COURT:

AfJNE M. iSTIRBA
ANNE
District Court Judge

JUDGMENT DEBTORS1 ADDRESSES:
Daniel D. Price
Susanne Q. Price
11113 S. Prescott Drive
Sandy, Utah 84092

-2Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Kent Swensen
Kay Swensen
1470 Pimilco Place
Sandy, Utah 84092
Ross Larrabee
Carma Larrabee
1565 East 11245 South
Sandy, Utah 84092

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Robert S. Schuetze
David J. Jordan
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

Casey K.WlcGarvey
|
Attorneys for Defendants
National Railroad Passenger Corporation and
Southern Pacific Transportation Company

Allan LLarson
Attorney for Defendant
City of South Jordan

-3Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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